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OFF-LABEL INNOVATION
David A. Simon*
Modern medicine faces many significant problems. This
Article is about two of them. The first is that approved drugs
have many potential therapeutic uses that are never identified,
investigated, or developed. The second is the routine practice of
physicians prescribing approved drugs for unapproved uses—
so-called “off-label” uses. These problems seem very different.
Failure to invest in potential new uses is an innovation
problem: firms lack incentives to research and develop new uses
of old drugs. The problem of off-label uses, on the other hand,
is one of safety and efficacy: off-label uses are risky because they
are not supported by the same level of evidence as approved
uses. While descriptively accurate, this is not the only accurate
description. Each of these problems is also one of information—
a lack of information about the safety and efficacy of
prescribing approved drugs for unapproved uses. Because all
new uses of approved drugs are off-label uses, gathering safety
and efficacy information about off-label uses, in effect, produces
safety and efficacy information about many new uses. Not only
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that, but some off-label uses may be new: physicians may
innovate by prescribing drugs off-label. Reframing these two
seemingly disparate problems in terms of a common
information deficit enables a single, information-based
solution. This solution—which draws on the existing suite of
innovation policy levers—incentivizes providers, rather than
pharmaceutical companies, to generate the post-market
information needed to address both problems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the
drug amantadine hydrochloride (amantadine) for the prevention of
Asian influenza A (H2N2).1 Doctors began prescribing the drug
shortly thereafter.2 One patient who was prescribed the drug also
happened to suffer from Parkinson’s disease (Parkinson’s).3 To her
surprise—and the surprise of her neurologists—many of her
neurological symptoms lessened shortly after starting a course of
the medication.4 Those doctors—who noted that “[s]uch
serendipitous findings are not rare[,] . . . especially in chronic
diseases”—proceeded to study amantadine’s effect on Parkinson’s.5
But it would be another seven years before the FDA approved
amantadine to treat that condition.6

Thomas H. Maugh II, Panel Urges Wide Use of Antiviral Drug, 206 SCIENCE 1058, 1058
(1979) (noting FDA approval following clinical trials that demonstrated 70 percent reductions
in illness from influenza A).
2 The story of amantadine’s unanticipated development is recounted in G. Hubsher, M.
Haider & M.S. Okun, Amantadine: The Journey from Fighting Flu to Treating Parkinson
Disease, 78 NEUROLOGY 1096, 1096–99 (2012).
3 See id. (“[A] 58-year-old woman with [Parkinson’s] had reported . . . an improvement in
rigidity, tremor, and akinesia while taking amantadine for flu.”).
4 Robert S. Schwab, Albert C. England, Jr., David C. Poskanzer & Robert R. Young,
Amantadine in the Treatment of Parkinson’s Disease, 208 JAMA 1168, 1168 (1969) (“[S]he
experienced a remarkable remission in her symptoms of rigidity, tremor, and akinesia.”).
5 Id.; see also Robert S. Schwab, David C. Poskanzer, Albert C. England, Jr., & Robert R.
Young, Amantadine in Parkinson’s Disease: Review of More Than Two Years’ Experience, 222
JAMA 792, 792–95 (1972) (describing prospective observational research).
6 See Letter from Henry E. Simmons, Director, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. (Apr. 17, 1973) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Notice of Approval] (approving Amantedine); Maugh, supra note 1, at 1058 (noting that the
FDA approved Symmetrel, DuPont’s trade name for amantadine, to treat Parkinson’s in
1973); see also J. Máté et al., Prophylactic Use of Amantadine During Hong Kong Influenza
Epidemic, 17 ACTA MICROBIOLOGICA ACADEMIAE SCIENTAIARUM HUNGARICAE 285, 285 (1970)
(evaluating prophylaxis of drug for “Hong Kong flu”); U. Strömberg, T.H. Svensson & B.
Waldeck, On the Mode of Action of Amantadine, 22 J. PHARMACY & PHARMACOLOGY 959, 961
(1970) (observing that the drug’s effectiveness against Parkinson’s is “brought about by an
amphetamine-like mechanism”); Stanley Fahn, George Craddock & Gerald Kumin, Acute
Toxic Psychosis from Suicidal Overdosage of Amantadine, 25 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 45, 45
(1971) (hypothesizing that amantadine functions similarly to other Parkinson’s drug
treatments by releasing dopamine from neuronal storage sites); B. Cox & C.S. Williams,
Cardiovascular Responses to Amantadine Hydrochloride in the Rat and Rabbit, 43 BRITISH
1
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In the interim, and even after its approval for Parkinson’s,7
doctors would prescribe amantadine for an increasing number of
unapproved conditions, including shingles,8 chronic fatigue
syndrome,9 hepatitis,10 autism,11 Jakob-Creutzfeldt Disease,12

J. PHARMACOLOGY 575P, 575P (1972) (investigating the cardiovascular actions of
amantadine).
7 Amantadine has undergone several labeling changes relating to Parkinson’s, and the
FDA has approved new forms of the drug as recently as 2018. See Amantadine, PARKINSON’S
FOUNDATION, https://www.parkinson.org/UnderstandingParkinsons/Treatment/Prescription-Medications/Amantadine-Symmetrel (last visited Mar.
2, 2022) (listing different forms of amantadine used to mitigate Parkinson’s).
8 See, e.g., A.W. Galbraith, Treatment of Acute Herpes Zoster with Amantadine
Hydrochloride (Symmetrel), 4 BRIT. MED. J. 693, 693 (1973) (stating that the study of 100
patients was initiated after the author received personal communication from another
physician, G.H. Lloyd, who reported that “amantadine reduced the duration of pain, produced
more rapid healing, and prevented postherpetic neuralgia”).
9 See Marjorie A. Bowman, Julienne K. Kirk, Robert Michielutte & John S. Preisser, Use
of Amantadine for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1264, 1264
(1997) (explaining that a four-patient trial was stimulated by other research showing use of
amantadine and symptom reduction (fatigue) in patients suffering from multiple sclerosis).
10 See Jill Palmer Smith, Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C with Amantadine, 42 DIGESTIVE
DISEASES & SCIS. 1681, 1682 (1997) (stating that the purpose of study was to test the “safety
and efficacy of amantadine in patients with chronic hepatitis C infection”); Isabelle Fouchard
Hubert, Françoise Lunel, Jean-François Cadranel, Frédéric Iberti & Paul Calès, Treatment
of Chronic Hepatitis C with Amantadine, 94 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 2316, 2316–17 (1999)
(reporting an open-label, prospective pilot study of sixteen patients based on Smith’s initial
report and finding that amantadine was not effective in inducing a biochemical or virological
response in patients suffering from chronic hepatitis C); Pierre Deltenre et al., Evaluation of
Amantadine in Chronic Hepatitis C: A Meta-Analysis, 41 J. HEPATOLOGY 462, 462–73 (2004)
(finding mixed results and suggesting further clinical trials on amantadine for chronic
hepatitis C).
11 See Bryan H. King et al., Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Study of Amantadine
Hydrochloride in the Treatment of Children with Autistic Disorder, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 658, 659 (2001) (hypothesizing amantadine might be effective in
treating neurobehavioral disorders based on its mechanism of action and limited reports in
the medical literature, including as treatment for brain injury).
12 For example, one doctor published an article explaining how he treated a patient with
Jakob-Creutzfeldt Disease, a rare neurodegenerative disease affecting the brain. See J.
Braham, Jakob-Creutzfeldt Disease: Treatment by Amantadine, 4 BRIT. MED. J.212, 213
(1971) (noting that the doctor hypothesized that amantadine might be effective based on its
initial results treating Parkinson’s disease).
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epilepsy,13 and traumatic brain injury (TBI).14 And they would do so
despite the unknown efficacy and risks of prescribing amantadine
See W. Donald Shields, Jean L. Lake & Harry T. Chugani, Amantadine in the Treatment
of Refractory Epilepsy in Childhood: An Open Trial in 10 Patients, 35 NEUROLOGY 579, 579
(1985) (noting that the authors first administered the drug to two patients based on a
hypothesized link to amantadine’s mechanism of action and noticed immediate reduction in
symptoms and then proceeded to conduct a ten-patient open trial (citing L.F. Quesney, F.
Andermann & P. Gloor, Dopaminergic Mechanism in Generalized Photosensitive Epilepsy, 31
NEUROLOGY 1542, 1542–44 (1981))). This, in turn, has spurred further investigation into
amantadine’s use in other epileptic conditions. See Rujuta B. Wilson, Yazan Eliyan, Raman
Sankar & Shaun A. Hussain, Amantadine: A New Treatment for Refractory Electrical Status
Epilepticus in Sleep, 84 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 74, 75 (2018) (testing the hypothesis that
“amantadine may target mechanisms that underlie ESES and associated epileptic
encephalopathy”).
14 In 1988, one doctor posited that amantadine might be helpful to treat brain injuries
based on anecdotal reports “suggest[ing] that amantadine may have some benefit in the
chronic TBI patient,” as well as limited research on rats. C. T. Gualtieri, Pharmacotherapy
and the Neurobehavioural Sequelae of Traumatic Brian Injury, 2 BRAIN INJURY 101, 107
(1988) (discussing Rocco F. Marotta, Nancy Logan, Michael Potegal, Murray Glusman & Eliot
L. Gardner, Dopamine Agonists Induce Recovery from Surgically-Induced Septal Rage, 269
NATURE 513, 513 (1977)); see also Thomas Gualtieri, Mark Chandler, Tena B. Coons & Lloyd
T. Brown, Amantadine: A New Clinical Profile for Traumatic Brain Injury, 12 CLINICAL
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 258, 260 (1989) (discussing the author’s previous innovative off-label
use as the impetus for undertaking study of amantadine for brain injury (citing Mark C.
Chandler, Jarrett L. Barnhill & C. Thomas Gualtieri, Amantadine for the Agitated HeadInjury Patient, 2 BRAIN INJURY 309, 310 (1988))); Gualtieri et al., supra, at 260 (discussing
how amantadine could be used to treat patients with head injuries). That hypothesis was
subsequently taken up in limited research. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Kraus & Pauline M. Maki,
Effect of Amantadine Hydrochloride on Symptoms of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Brain
Injury: Case Studies and Review, 9 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 222, 224
(1997) (reviewing the literature and noting that amantadine’s “use in other disorders, such
as epilepsy, dementia, and brain injury, has been prompted by case studies or small controlled
studies showing improvements in cognitive functioning, EEG records, activity levels, or
depressive symptoms”); R. Van Reekum et al., N of 1 Study: Amantadine for the
Amotivational Syndrome in a Patient with Traumatic Brain Injury, 9 BRAIN INJURY 49, 50
(1995) (stating that the hypothesis of the study was that amantadine would improve the
rehabilitation of a patient with amotivational syndrome, which developed after a traumatic
brain injury). It is also interesting to note that one of these physicians continued to find
innovative off-label use of another drug, methylphenidate (Ritalin), for the same condition
(TBI). See Randall W. Evans, C Thomas Gualtieri & Debra Patterson, Treatment of Chronic
Closed Head Injury with Psychostimulant Drugs: A Controlled Case Study and an
Appropriate Evaluation Procedure, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 106, 109 (1987)
(noting that closed head injury patients “may find partial relief from attentional, memory,
and behavioral impairments” after taking methylphenidate). Methylphenidate is now
commonly used to treat the sequelae of TBI. See Samir Al-Adawi et al., Methylphenidate
Improves Executive Functions in Patients with Traumatic Brain Injuries: A Feasibility Trial
13
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for new indications in populations—some of whom probably took
other medications—with underlying health conditions. Researchers
identified some of these potential uses from the initial investigation
spurred by the first patient report.15 Other uses, including
amantadine’s uses for treating Jakob-Creutzfeldt Disease and
epilepsy, were tested by physicians prescribing this approved drug
for unapproved uses—they were prescribing “off-label.”16
How were so many doctors prescribing approved drugs for such
different unapproved uses, especially given that those unapproved
uses had unknown risks? While this may seem puzzling, it is
actually quite common. Physicians frequently prescribe drugs offlabel.17 And in some areas of medicine, such as cardiology and
psychiatry, off-label prescriptions predominate.18 Yet, the discovery
of amantadine as a treatment for Parkinson’s and other conditions,
and its slow development for many of those uses, highlights two
important problems for medicine that remain unsolved—and how to
solve them.
One is the “Problem of Off-Label Uses.”19 Off-label uses may not
be supported by the same level of evidence as approved, on-label
uses. Patients prescribed drugs off-label are, therefore, subjected to
a greater risk of harm. The risk, however, is often necessary for
patients with limited or no efficacious on-label treatments. At the
time doctors discovered that amantadine might have some effect on
Parkinson’s, for example, no known curative treatments for it

via
the
Idiographic
Approach,
20
BMC NEUROLOGY
103,
104
(2020),
https://bmcneurol.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12883-020-01663-x.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Hubsher, supra note 1, at 1098 (noting that the initial research spurred the role
of L-dopa as a response predictor).
16 See David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (explaining
the background of off-label medicine use).
17 See id. at 1025 (finding that “about 21% of all estimated uses for commonly prescribed
medications were off-label”).
18 See id. at 1023–25 (“Off-label use was most common among cardiac Medications.”); see,
e.g., CAVALLA, infra note 86, at 13 (noting the prevalence of off-label prescriptions “may be up
to 90% in some hospitalised paediatric patients”),
19 See Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regulating
Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 388 (2014) (“The central problem with
off-label use is that there is an information deficit.”).
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existed.20 Like all off-label uses, amantadine’s safety and efficacy
profile for Parkinson’s was largely unknown because it hadn’t been
researched either through observational studies (where researchers
make observations without any interventions)21 or experimental
randomized controlled clinical trials (RCT)22 (where researchers
typically randomize subjects into treatment and control groups and
ensure that neither the subject nor the researcher knows who is in
which group).23 The same is true for its current off-label use by
doctors to treat many other conditions, such as TBI.24
One reason for the lack of research into new uses of existing
drugs, including widespread off-label uses, is because of a different
challenge, dubbed the “Problem of New Uses”25: patent law and drug
regulation—which work well for some kinds of novel drug
development26—don’t always provide sufficient economic incentives
20 Even today there is no known cure. Most therapies attempt to address the neuromotor
symptoms that the disease causes. See e.g., Hubsher, supra note 1, at 1097 (noting that
several prior animal studies focused on symptoms of “psychomotor agitation”).
21 See ALLAN K. HACKSHAW, A CONCISE GUIDE TO OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES IN HEALTHCARE
1–24 (2015). Observational studies can take different forms. Id. at 10–13.
22 See, e.g., DAVID MACHIN & PETER M. FAYERS, RANDOMIZED CLINICAL TRIALS: DESIGN,
PRACTICE AND REPORTING 23–39 (2010) (explaining the general structure of randomized
clinical trials); SHEIN-CHUNG CHOW & JEN-PEI LIU, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL
TRIALS: CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGIES 167–207 (3d ed. 2014) (reviewing eight design types
of clinical trials); TOM BRODY, CLINICAL TRIALS: STUDY DESIGN, ENDPOINTS AND
BIOMARKERS, DRUG SAFETY, AND FDA AND ICH GUIDELINES 131–41 (2011) (describing one
and two arm trials).
23 Some aspects of the amantadine drug safety profile were known from previous
applications. See Hubsher, supra note 1, at 1097. But the safety and efficacy profile for the
specific dosages, indication, and patient populations was unknown. See id.
24 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
717, 717 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses] (examining “the problem
of motivating firms to invest in rigorous testing of new uses for previously approved drugs”);
see also Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses 2–3 (Oct. 14, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/Solving-the-Problem-of-New-Uses-Benn.-Roin.pdf (“This well-known gap in the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation—known
as ‘the problem of new uses’—causes most (and perhaps almost all) of these potential new
medical treatments to remain untested hypotheses.” (footnotes omitted)).
26 See infra note 28 and accompanying text. But see Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi
Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical
Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2044–85 (2015) (noting that existing incentives can actually
discourage investment in clinical trials with longer lag times from invention to
commercialization and that existing patent laws reinforce this phenomenon by rewarding the
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for companies to research and develop (R&D) new uses for old drugs
(and existing off-label uses).27 Although R&D for new uses is much
cheaper than R&D for new drug molecules,28 firms often don’t
pursue it because they can’t exclude others (enough) from using the
results.29
Research on amantadine illustrates this.30 The FDA approved
amantadine in 1966, the same year the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) issued to DuPont two patents related to
amantadine.31 From 1966 until 1983 when amantadine’s patents
expired—and especially before Congress enacted the Hatch-

inventor of a pharmaceutical with longer patent terms (via patent term extensions) and
penalizing greater commercial lags with shorter patent terms).
27 The general phenomenon of finding new uses for existing compounds is called
“repurposing” or “repositioning.” Sometimes this means only finding new uses of approved
drugs; other times it means finding new uses of approved drugs or abandoned pharmaceutical
candidates. Compare Marina Sirota et al., Discovery and Preclinical Validation of Drug
Indications Using Compendia of Public Gene Expression Data, 3 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED.
96ra77, 96ra77 (2011) (using the former definition), with Divya Sardana et al., Drug
Repositioning for Orphan Diseases, 12 BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 346, 346 (2011) (using
the latter definition).
28 There are almost no studies documenting the clinical development time for new
indications of existing drugs. But see, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Innovating by Developing New
Uses of Already-Approved Drugs: Trends in the Marketing Approval of Supplemental
Indications, 35 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 808, 809, 816–17 (2013) [hereinafter DiMasi, sNDAs]
(analyzing the “application-review times for new uses of already-approved drugs”).
29 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1942–43 (2013) (explaining that “there are some highly
nonexcludable goods whose development a patent system will fail to incentivize because the
private returns appropriable using patents remain lower than the private costs of creation or
validation”).
30 Another example is chenodeoxycholic acid (Chenodiol), which physicians discovered as
an off-label treatment for cerebrotendinous xanthomatosis (CTX) decades ago. See Dr.
Patroula Smpokou, Remarks at Nat’l Ctr. for Advancing Translational Scis. Meeting:
Repurposing Off-Patent Drugs: Research & Regulatory Challenges 63 (Apr. 6, 2020)
[hereinafter
NCATS
Meeting],
https://ncats.nih.gov/files/repurposing-off-patentdrugs_research--regulatory-challenges_day-1-transcript_04-06-2020.pdf.
Since
then,
physicians have used the drug off-label as the treatment of choice for CTX, and it is now the
standard of care. Id. No company has sought a Supplemental New Drug Application (sNDA)
or New Drug Application (NDA) for Chenodiol to treat CTX.
31 Compare U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Notice of Approval, supra note 6 (approving
amantadine for use in treating Parkinson’s), with U.S. Patent No. 3,391,142 (filed Feb. 9,
1966) (issued July 2, 1968).
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Waxman Act in 198432—DuPont had incentives to invest in clinical
trials needed to obtain FDA approval for other possible indications,
including Parkinson’s.33 The strength of these incentives, of course,
waned as 1983 and 1984 drew closer, and largely dried up
thereafter.34 As the patent term decreased, DuPont’s ability to
recoup investment costs and turn a profit also decreased.35 Because
shrinking patent terms framed smaller and smaller windows to
generate a return, incentives to invest in new uses of the patented
drug decreased along with the patent term.
When the patent expired, generics could enter the market and
drive down the price of the drug.36 Research on new uses of
amantadine, as a result, hasn’t moved as quickly as research on its
use to treat Parkinson’s, for example.37 This problem does not
disappear even if pharmaceutical companies have the proper
incentives to invest in research of some off-label or new uses. There
are thousands, potentially tens of thousands, of new uses; it’s
impossible for drug companies to finance clinical trials for every new
use, or even for a majority of them.
These two Problems seem separate and unrelated—and most
scholars have approached them that way.38 The Problem of OffLabel Uses is a safety and efficacy problem: off-label use is
32 See U.S. Patent No. 3,256,329 (filed June 9, 1964) (issued June 14, 1966) (issuing an
original patent for amantadine); U.S. Patent No. 3,257,456 (filed May 4, 1964) (issued June
21, 1966) (issuing patent for “2-Adamantanone and derivatives”). Although the patents
expired in 1983, the existing regulatory regime made it difficult for generics to enter the
market even after a patent expired. See infra Section II.B. That changed with the HatchWaxman Act of 1984. See infra Section II.B. Given the limited evidence, it is not entirely clear
whether it was the patent or the Hatch-Waxman Act that changed the investment landscape.
33 See infra Section II.B.
34 See supra note 32.
35 See infra note 147.
36 Generics did enter the market in 1987 when FDA approved Upsher Smith Labs’
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). See Product Details for ANDA 070589, ANDA:
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
070589,
U.S.
.https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=A&Appl_No
=070589#23616, (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (noting that Upsher Smith Laboratories LLC
applied for the approval and that the drug was approved on August 5, 1986).
37 There are a variety of other relevant differences between drug approval now and drug
approval in 1973 that make the comparison inexact.
38 I refer to the “Problem of New Uses” and the “Problem of Off-Label Uses” collectively as
“the Problems.” When I discuss either individually, I refer to them, where appropriate, as
“Problem.”
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potentially harmful and wasteful because doctors prescribe drugs
for unapproved uses without sufficient evidence of the safety and
efficacy to support them. The Problem of New Uses is an innovation
problem: pharmaceutical companies lack incentives to invest in
R&D of new uses of approved drugs.39 Framing the Problems
separately leads many scholars to propose discrete solutions to each
of them. Scholars focused on off-label use have, by and large,
proposed limitations on the practice.40 Those concerned with new
uses, by contrast, recommend various tweaks to patent law and
market exclusivity to capture new uses.41 While the former attempt
to reduce unnecessary off-label use, the latter try to increase the
number of safe and effective new uses. Unfortunately, neither has
succeeded—and it’s still unclear how to make headway in either
domain.
One reason the Problems seem intractable is because of the way
they are framed—as separate and unrelated. This Article’s first
contribution is to make them tractable by reframing them in terms
of their commonalities, rather than their differences: the
information needed to solve, or at least ameliorate, both Problems
is often the same information. Because all new uses of approved
drugs are off-label uses, safety and efficacy information about
approved new uses is also safety and efficacy information about offlabel uses. Safety and efficacy information about off-label uses, in
many cases, will also be safety and efficacy information about new
uses. Put another way, information about off-label uses can be
information about new uses, and information about new uses is
always information about off-label uses.42

39 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29 (explaining that patent law can have distortive
(demand) effects because some kinds of informational goods can be difficult to exclude despite
their high social value that cannot be resolved by resorting to internal features of patent law
and arguing that government should be involved in a greater range of research-related
activities).
40 See infra Section II.A.
41 See infra Section II.B.
42 The quantity of off-label uses that are also new uses depends, in part, on how you define
“new uses.” Defining the question by reference to evidence makes all off-label uses new uses.
If you define it by reference to undiscovered uses, then the overlap shrinks considerably.
Discussions of new uses frequently fail to distinguish between these different senses of “new
uses” and, therefore, tend not to see the similarities between the two problems. See infra
Section II.C for a full discussion.
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Recognizing the informational overlap enables this Article to
make a second contribution: the entities best positioned to solve
both Problems are not pharmaceutical companies, but providers—
entities that actually provide services, such as hospitals, academic
medical centers, health systems, healthcare networks, and even
small office-based physician practices. The rationale for targeting
providers is simple. They generate, or have the capability to
generate, much of the needed post-market information about offlabel drug prescriptions, use, and effects. And many providers,
particularly large providers, have existing systems to monitor
prescriptions and patients that can be leveraged to track and
analyze off-label use. They also have institutional resources and
knowledge that can be deployed to research off-label uses. The
problem is that they lack incentives to do so.
Identifying the optimal set of incentives without further study is
not possible. Instead, this Article seeks to illustrate how some
incentives might capture innovative off-label uses, as well as data
about off-label use and its effects. Four possible incentives—three
ex ante (push) and one ex post (pull)—are reviewed. Two of the push
incentives are government subsidies. The first is an existing
government program that could be retooled for off-label use. The
second is a new government subsidy to stimulate data collection,
organization, and dissemination about off-label uses. The third
push incentive is a tax credit. The fourth and final inducements
discussed are variants of pull incentives that aim to produce data
from clinical trials and observational studies: royalties, payments,
or prizes for evidence development that result in FDA approval. The
goal of Part III of the Article is not to assess which of these is best;
rather, it’s designed to show that there are a variety of policy levers
that can be pulled to deliver the desired outcome: more safety and
efficacy information about new and off-label uses.
Tackling the problems this way—by recognizing their
informational commonality—has several significant benefits. First,
it’s efficient. Addressing both problems at the same time, with the
same solution, costs less than addressing both at different times,
with different solutions. Second, it’s synergistic: addressing the
Problem of New Uses will increase the number of better-supported
uses and decrease the number of unsafe or ineffective off-label
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uses.43 The result is more uses supported by better evidence and
fewer uses supported by weak or no evidence. At the same time,
addressing the problem of off-label uses will help ameliorate the
problem of new uses by identifying and researching innovative and
valuable off-label uses. Third, it circumvents the problem of
potentially negative information that typically dogs new uses.44
Because drug manufacturers that conduct R&D of new uses risk
discovering that the new use—or, worse still, the current approved
use—is not safe and effective, they may be reluctant to do so.45
Finally, this approach doesn’t disturb existing incentives to pursue
new drugs or new treatments. This is important because the
existing incentive framework does produce valuable information,
including some information about unapproved new uses of approved
drugs.
Implementing new incentive structures, or leveraging old ones,
entails costs—costs of legislative changes, of administration, of
information collection and analysis. These costs are substantial. But
they can’t be properly known or weighed without further research.
While that study can’t be undertaken here, this Article seeks to
achieve a more modest aim: to show that, whatever the costs,
focusing attention on providers is one way to both identify new uses
43 See infra Section III.C. It will do this, however, only if it generates the kind of information
needed for FDA approval. Even if this change doesn’t result in an expanded indication, it
would still provide much needed and valuable information about safety and efficacy (or at
least effectiveness). Although the concepts of efficacy and effectiveness are not identical, I use
them interchangeably throughout this Article. For a discussion of the FDA’s trend toward
accepting less traditional evidence, see Section II.C.
44 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the
Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 14 (2017) (describing opportunities to fund new uses).
45 This worst-case scenario is what happened with the drug Vioxx (rofecoxib). The FDA
approved Merck’s NDA in 1999 for the treatment for osteoarthritis, acute pain, and primary
dysmenorrhea. See Letter from Brian E. Harvey, Acting Division Director, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., to Dr. Evan M. Braunstein, Merck & Co., Inc. (Dec. 16, 2003),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/021042_S024_VIOXXTM_APPRO
V.pdf. In 2000, Merck conducted research into whether the drug could prevent recurrent colon
polyps. See Vioxx (rofecoxib) Questions and Answers, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, (Sept. 30,
2004), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-andproviders/vioxx-rofecoxib-questions-and-answers. The results of this new study showed that
those who took the drug had an “increased risk [for] cardiovascular events such as heart
attack and strokes.” Id. Merck voluntarily pulled the drug from the market in 2004. Rebecca
S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 10 (2017).
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of approved drugs and generate better information about the safety
and efficacy of off-label uses.
Part II of this Article explains the Problems of Off-Label Uses
and the Problems of New Uses in detail. Both of these Problems, it
shows, often overlap. In many cases, safety and efficacy information
about off-label uses will be safety and efficacy information about
new uses. And, in other cases, information about new uses of
existing drugs will also be information about new, off-label uses that
providers are testing in the field. In other words, there is a large
informational overlap between the two Problems. Part III argues
that providers are an untapped source of potential information that
could ameliorate, if not solve, both Problems. Part IV describes
potential provider-based incentives that would generate data to fill
the informational deficit common to both Problems. While it doesn’t
offer one specific solution, it proposes several mechanisms—some
old, some new, some push, some pull—to incentivize providers to
produce, collect, analyze, and publish more information about
innovative and existing off-label uses.

II. THE PROBLEM OF OFF-LABEL USES &
THE PROBLEM OF NEW USES
The purpose of this Part is to explain both Problems and how
they are related to the same information. Section A explains the
Problem of Off-Label Uses, why it’s a problem, and how scholars
have proposed to rectify it. Section B follows the same structure with
respect to the Problem of New Uses. Section C shows how these two
Problems often stem from a lack of identical information. This
informational overlap naturally suggests a solution that focuses on
the entities best positioned to collect the needed information:
providers.
A. THE PROBLEM OF OFF-LABEL USES

Patients with diseases that lack FDA-approved treatments still
need access to drugs that might help them. Prescribing drugs under
these conditions, however, is often risky because the safety and
efficacy data are limited. This is, as I explain below, a problem of
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information. And most scholars have tried to solve it by limiting offlabel use.
1. Off-Label Use. Off-label use occurs when a physician
prescribes an approved drug for an unapproved use.46 Approved
drugs are those that the FDA has decided, at the insistence of
pharmaceutical companies, are safe and effective for an intended
use. Without this approval, drugs generally can’t reach the
market.47 To obtain approval, a drug company must demonstrate to
the FDA that a drug is safe and effective for an intended use by
“substantial evidence.”48 It begins this process by filing an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND),49 which shows the
46 Off-label uses are also referred to in the literature as “unapproved” uses. See, e.g., M.M.
Saiyed, P.S. Ong & L. Chew, Off-Label Drug Use in Oncology: A Systematic Review of
Literature, 42 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 251, 256 (2017). When physicians
prescribe an unapproved drug—a drug not approved for any use by the FDA—the use is
unlicensed. Id. at 251. Both off-label and unapproved uses are different from compassionate
use or expanded access, which occurs when the FDA temporarily allows patients with serious
conditions to access “investigational medical products . . . outside of clinical trials when no
comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy options are available.” Expanded Access, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/expanded-access
(last updated Mar. 23, 2021).
47 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval . . . is effective with respect to such
drug.”); see also Enforcement Activities, Unapproved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June
2, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcement-activities-fda/unapproved-drugs (last
visited Apr. 26, 2022) (“Federal law requires all new drugs in the U.S. be shown to be safe
and effective for their intended use prior to marketing.”). But see id. (“FDA permits some
unapproved prescription drugs to be marketed [under three conditions].”).
48 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (“[T]he term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could
fairly and responsibly be concluded . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(v) (2020) (setting forth
requirements for the effectiveness of data); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2020) (stating the purpose of
conducting clinical drug investigations and describing the characteristics of a well-controlled
study).
49 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2020) (requiring sponsors intending to conduct clinical
investigations to submit an IND with specific content and format requirements); PETER
BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 674 (4th
ed. 2014) (explaining that “a manufacturer must first obtain FDA approval of a new drug
application” and that the FDA created the IND procedure to implement the congressional
exemption allowing new drug sponsors “to carry out the clinical testing necessary to support
FDA approval of an NDA”).
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FDA that the target drug has undergone preclinical testing in
animals.50 Once the IND goes into effect,51 there are usually three
phases of review.52 In Phase I,53 the company conducts clinical trials
with a small number of healthy volunteers to determine how the
drug works in the body, its relative safety, and, preliminarily, its
effectiveness.54 Phase II studies are directed toward efficacy.55 They
are usually somewhat larger than Phase I studies, up to a few
hundred participants, and are controlled using the relevant patient
population.56 Once a sponsor successfully completes Phase I and II
studies, it enters Phase III, conducting larger clinical trials to
determine the drug’s overall safety and efficacy.57 A drug sponsor
can and usually does consult with the FDA during any Phase, but it
is not required to do so.58 After completing all three Phases, the drug
sponsor can submit a new drug application (NDA) based on the
results of its clinical trials.59 In the NDA, the sponsor must also
make various filings and attestations about the drug and its
50 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2020) (dictating that the IND plan should include
“information about pharmacology and toxicological studies of the drug involving laboratory
animals”). These tests must have been conducted using good laboratory practices. 21 C.F.R.
§ 58 (2020); see also CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND
STUDIES 2–3 (2006) [hereinafter IND GUIDANCE], https://www.fda.gov/files/Guidance-toIndustry-and-Reviewers---Exploratory-IND-Studies-%28PDF%29.pdf (stating that an IND
containing information on “any risks anticipated based on the results of pharmacologic and
toxicological data collected during studies of the drug in animals” must be submitted before
human studies can begin); HUTT ET AL., supra note 49, at 671 (“During preclinical drug
development, a sponsor evaluates the drug’s toxic and pharmacologic effects through in vitro
and in vivo laboratory animal testing.”).
51 The IND will go into effect unless the FDA issues a clinical hold within 30 days of
receiving the IND. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (2020).
52 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2020).
53 In 2006, the FDA released guidance on so-called “Phase 0” studies, which were intended
to act as a “exploratory IND stud[ies]” occurring very early in Stage 1. IND GUIDANCE, supra
note 50, at 1.
54 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2020).
55 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2020) (“Phase 2 includes controlled clinical studies conducted
to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication . . . .”).
56 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2020).
57 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2020).
58 See The Drug Development Process, Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinicalresearch.
59 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2020).
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manufacturing practices.60 The purpose of an NDA is to convince
the FDA that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use.61
Drug makers expend large quantities of time and money building
their cases for the FDA, most of which are unpersuasive.62 The most
recent estimates peg new drug development capitalized costs at
between $1,395 million and $2,558 million,63 a figure that has grown
continually since Congress implemented the modern regulatory
regime in 1962.64 If a drug sponsor convinces the FDA to approve a
“new drug,” its approval is limited to using the drug for a specific
21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2020).
See The Drug Development Process, Step 4: FDA Drug Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-4-fda-drugreview. In some cases, sponsors conduct Phase IV studies. These studies include postmarketing surveillance imposed by the FDA and “real world” tests of a drug after it hits the
market. See Viraj Suvarna, Phase IV of Drug Development, 1 PERSPS. CLINICAL RSCH. 57, 57–
58 (2010).
62 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 23 (2016)
[hereinafter DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (estimating an 11.83%
overall probability that a drug that enters clinical testing will eventually be approved); J.A.
DiMasi, L. Feldman, A. Seckler & A. Wilson, Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug
Development: Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 272, 276 (2010) (“For self-originated new drugs that first entered clinical
testing in 1993–2004 and were observed through mid-2009, the results indicated that
approximately one in six drugs that enter the clinical testing pipeline will eventually obtain
approval for marketing in the United States.”); Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives
for Neglected Diseases: Lessons from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 457,
462 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (“[I]t it takes several hundred
million dollars to discover, develop, and gain regulatory approval for a new medicine.”). But
see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1616 & n.131
(2003) (noting that the $800 million R&D figure is “almost certainly inflated” because it
includes sizeable advertising budgets).
63 See DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 62, at 26
(finding fully capitalized total costs of $2558 million per approved new drug during the 2000s
to mid 2010s); Steve Morgan, Paul Grootendorst, Joel Lexchin, Colleen Cunningham & Devon
Greyson, The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic Review, 100 HEALTH POL’Y 4, 7 tbl.1
(2011) (compiling studies and total estimates of cost of drug development); Joseph A. DiMasi,
Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 162 tbl.1 (2003) [hereinafter DiMasi et al., The
Price of Innovation] (finding an average out-of-pocket clinical period cost for investigational
compounds of $60.6 million).
64 See, e.g., DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation, supra note 63, at 154 fig.1 (displaying
the upward trend in inflation-adjusted industry R&D expenditures from 1963 to 2000).
60
61
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indication (condition), at a specific dose, by a specific route of
administration, often in a specific population.65 By law, all of this
information must appear on the drug’s labeling.66 Drug
manufacturers are not permitted to market their products in a
manner inconsistent with the approved NDA or drug labeling.67
But physicians aren’t bound by labels. Because the FDA doesn’t
regulate the practice of medicine,68 physicians are free to prescribe
any approved drug for a different indication, at a different dose, by
a different route of administration, in a different patient

65 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018) (regulating “new drugs”); 21 C.F.R. §310.3(g)–(h) (2020)
(defining “new drug substance” and establishing that the newness of a drug may arise from,
among other reasons,“[t]he newness of a dosage, or method or duration of administration or
application, or other condition of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
of such drug”).
66 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.50, 201.51, 201.55, 201.56, 201.57 (2019) (setting out labeling
requirements for a drug’s statement of identity, net quantity, dosage, and other content and
format standards). But see id. § 201.58 (providing that applicants can request the FDA to
waive labeling requirements).
67 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018) (requiring approval for new drugs); 21 U.S.C.
§ 352(a)(1) (2018) (requiring drugs to conform to labeling approved under 21 U.S.C. § 355);
21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (2019) (requiring labels for prescription drugs for human use to bear
adequate information for use); 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2018) (defining labeling). For more about
how the FDA prosecutes off-label regulation, see David A. Simon, Evidence-Based Regulation
of Off-Label Information 7–8 (Oct. 18, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Simon, Off-Label Information] (“Beyond labeling, the FDA can prosecute claims
of off-label promotion using its power to regulate drug advertising.”). See also David A. Simon,
Trademark Law & Consumer Safety, 72 FLA. L. REV. 673, 711 (2020) [hereinafter Simon,
Consumer Safety] (explaining that since Congress expanded the power and scope of the FDA’s
authority in 2007, the FDA has increasingly used trademark law to regulate both prescription
and over-the-counter drugs).
68 See FDA’s Role in Regulating Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 31,
2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/home-use-devices/fdas-role-regulating-medicaldevices (“FDA regulates the sale of medical device products . . . and monitors the safety of all
regulated medical products. . . . The FDA does not have the authority to[] [r]egulate a
physician’s or nurse’s practice.”).
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population.69 When they do, they are prescribing “off-label.”70 They
are prescribing an approved drug for a use that the FDA did not
approve.71 Although what counts as off-label use isn’t static72 or
uniformly defined,73 this description is useful and precise enough
for purposes of this Article.74
Physicians prescribe drugs off-label for various reasons.
Sometimes there are no front-line treatments for a particular
condition.75 So the physician may try an approved medication for
another condition by using it off-label in an attempt to provide relief
69 See Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of
Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 650, 661–64 (2011) (“Typical
off-label uses (OLU) include promoting, prescribing, and ingesting substances for conditions
other than those for which they were approved, in higher- or lower-than-indicated dosages,
and in populations other than those in which they were tested.”); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., “OFF-LABEL” AND INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF MARKETED DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND
MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL
INVESTIGATORS (1998), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/label-and-investigational-use-marketed-drugs-biologics-and-medical-devices
(“Good medical practice and the best interests of the patient require that physicians use
legally available drugs, biologics and devices according to their best knowledge and
judgement. If physicians use a product for an indication not in the approved labeling, they
have the responsibility to be well informed . . . .”).
70 Even outside the United States, the definition is largely the same. See, e.g., Marc Dooms,
David Cassiman & Steven Simoens, Off-Label Use of Orphan Medicinal Products: A Belgian
Qualitative Study, 11 ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 1, 1 (2016) (“Off-label use of a medicinal
product entails the intentional use of the medicinal product for any indication, population,
dosage, administration route or treatment duration other than that approved by a country’s
regulatory authority.”).
71 Not all off-label uses are reimbursed either by private insurance or by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). See Simon, Off-Label Information, supra note 67, at
41.
72 See Saiyed et al., supra note 46, at 256 (“Prescribing practices reported as ‘off-label’ in
the literature years back might not be considered off-label today due to changes in prescribing
information.").
73 See Joana Magalhães et al., Use of Off-Label and Unlicenced Drugs in Hospitalised
Paediatric Patients: A Systematic Review, 71 EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1, 8 (2015)
(listing different methodologies of determining what off-label use entails, stating “there was
no consensus on a common definition of off-label and unlicensed drugs”).
74 An off-label use isn’t an “improper, illegal, contraindicated, or investigational use.” Xiulu
Ruan & Alan David Kaye, Off-Label Prescribing: Justified or Not?, 31 AM. J. MED. QUALITY
101, 101 (2016).
75 See, e.g., Mahmoud Chehab, Alosh Madala & J.C. Trussell, On-Label and Off-Label
Drugs Used in the Treatment of Male Infertility, 103 FERTILITY & STERILITY 595, 595 (2015)
(describing the necessity of off-label treatments for male infertility without known cause).
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for a patient where there might otherwise be none.76 Other times,
clinical data may not exist for the population the doctor treats
despite using the medication to treat the same condition as one
listed on the approved labeling.77 This is common in pediatric
practices, for example, because children often can’t be included in
study populations for ethical reasons.78 Physicians treating these
patient populations often must prescribe drugs off-label—the
patient population is different—because sponsors can’t or won’t
conduct the clinical trials necessary for FDA approval.79 On
occasion, as well, an off-label use may be the standard of care to
treat a particular condition.80 Doctors, for example, frequently

76 See, e.g., Svetlana Goločorbin Kon, Ivana Iliĉkoviĉ & Momir Mikov, Reasons for and
Frequency of Off-Label Drug Use, 68 MEDICINSKI PREGLED 35, 38 (2015) (noting that the lack
of effective and safe treatments is a primary reason for off-label use).
77 See, e.g., Martha M. Rumore, Medication Repurposing in Pediatric Patients: Teaching
Old Drugs New Tricks, 21 J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 36, 37 (2016). But
see 26 U.S.C. § 45(e)(11)(C) (providing tax credits for clinical testing expenses for certain
drugs); infra Section III.D (discussing how tax incentives can induce providers to institute offlabel use).
78 See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate
Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 655 (2013) (“[R]esearch protocol typically
excludes children . . . who are more vulnerable to adverse drug reactions (which might reflect
badly on the drug) . . . .”); Jennifer L. Herbst, How Medicare Part D, Medicaid, Electronic
Prescribing, and ICD-10 Could Improve Public Health (But Only If CMS Lets Them), 24
HEALTH MATRIX 209, 241 (2014) [hereinafter Herbst, Medicare Part D] (“[M]any of the
patients historically covered by Medicaid—children . . . are also often excluded from clinical
trials for both ethical and practical reasons.”); id. at 241–43 (describing the benefits of private
insurer, Medicare, and Medicaid databases providing “a broader cross-section of the
population”).
79 The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) has changed this somewhat, but
sponsors are still reluctant to conduct trials on children below the age of 12. See 21 U.S.C. §§
355a, 355c (detailing the application and approval process for “[p]ediatric studies of drugs”
and “[r]esearch into pediatric uses for drugs and biological products”); Rumore, supra note
77, at 36–37, 37 tbl.1 (discussing several reasons why companies are reluctant to conduct
research in the pediatric population, such as how the FDA does not mandate pediatric ages
to be tested, indicating some medications received exclusivity by testing in 12- to 17-yearolds, and listing various provisions of the BPCA).
80 See Jennifer L. Herbst, The Short-Sighted Value of Inefficiency: Why We Should Mind
the Gap in the Reimbursement of Outpatient Prescription Drugs, 2 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH.
& INTERNET 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Herbst, Short-Sighted] (“Off-label use of prescription
drugs . . . occasionally reflects the recognized standard of care for a disease or condition.”).
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prescribe amitriptyline81 to treat neuropathic pain82 even though it
is approved only to treat depression.83
Prescribing drugs off-label is considered an essential part of
medicine for several reasons. First, it allows physicians to tailor
treatment choices to individual patients.84 Second, off-label use
enables physicians to treat patients when, as noted above, no onlabel treatment options exist, or where the off-label use is the
standard of care.85 Finally, and this is a point I return to in Section
II.C, off-label prescribing is a source of innovation in drug use and
development.
2. The Problem of Off-Label Uses as an Informational Problem.
Although off-label uses are important, they can also be riskier than
on-label uses. Off-label uses may not be supported by the same kind
or quantity of evidence as on-label uses.86 Some may be supported
by a single case report or a series of them or by varying kinds of
Joseph Acton, John E. McKenna & Ronald Melzack, Amitriptyline Produces Analgesia
in the Formalin Pain Test, 117 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 94–95 (1992) (describing that
Amitriptyline is a drug designed to treat depression that has been shown to have other uses).
Another example is chenodeoxycholic acid (Chenodiol), described supra note 30.
82 See, e.g., Acton et al., supra note 81, at 94–95 (“Amitriptyline . . . [is] often extremely
effective in relieving various forms of chronic pain.”); Kalso Eija, Tasmuth Tiina & Neuvonen
Pertti J, Amitriptyline Effectively Relieves Neuropathic Pain Following Treatment of Breast
Cancer, 64 PAIN 293, 301 (1995) (“The number of daily activities being disturbed by pain and
the effect of pain on daily life were significantly reduced with amitriptyline.”); R. Andrew
Moore, Sheena Derry, Dominic Aldington, Peter Cole & Phillip J. Wiffen, Amitriptyline for
Neuropathic Pain in Adults, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 2 (2015),
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/14651858.CD008242.pub2 (“Amitriptyline is commonly used to
treat neuropathic pain conditions . . . . ”). But see Diana D. Cardenas, Catherine A. Warms,
Judith A. Turner, Helen Marshall, Marvin M. Brooke & John D. Loeser, Efficacy of
Amitriptyline for Relief of Pain in Spinal Cord Injury: Results of a Randomized Controlled
Trial, 96 PAIN 365, 372 (2002) (“Possibly amitriptyline might be more efficacious for certain
types of pain, but our exploratory analyses did not reveal such effects. . . . ”).
83 The FDA approved amitriptyline (trade name Elavil) for depression on April 7, 1961 in
NDA 012703 (approval for new molecular entity). See Food and Drug Admin., Determination
that Elavil (Amitriptyline Hydrochloride) Oral Tablets, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, and 150
Milligrams, Were Not Withdrawn from Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 82 Fed.
Reg. 49,032, 49,033 (Oct. 23, 2017) (describing how Elavil was “initially approved on April 7,
1961” for “relief of symptoms of depression”).
84 See infra note 186.
85 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., DAVID CAVALLA, OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING: JUSTIFYING UNAPPROVED MEDICINE
8–11 (2015) (discussing how “the prescription of a drug in an off-label fashion, based as it is
on limited evidence, does not itself result in the enlargement of the evidence base”).
81
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observational studies, clinical trials, or meta-analyses. One study
even claims to show that a large portion of off-label uses lacks any
evidentiary basis.87 If true, this means limited or no safety and
efficacy data support existing prescribing practices. If limited data
do exist, they may be confined to closely related indications or
consist of limited reporting of use or case studies in the literature.
This lack of information poses serious risks to, and imposes real
monetary costs on, patients who fall outside of the approved
labeling. Off-label use increases the chance of adverse events.88
These risks increase as evidence for the relevant use thins out.89
One reason for this is that drug effects are hard to predict. Even the
same dose of a drug can have wildly different effects in disparate
patient populations. Children, for example, metabolize drugs
differently than adults, complicating attempts by physicians to
extrapolate dosage from one to the other.90 A lack of studies
involving children, however, makes extrapolation necessary.91
Patients also may have comorbidities, or simply different genotypes,
that make adverse reactions more or less likely.92 In psychiatry,
where off-label use is prevalent, the risk is not merely using a drug
with limited evidence but failing to treat the underlying behavioral
87 See David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (“[W]e
found that about 21% of all estimated uses for commonly prescribed medications were offlabel, and that 15% of all estimated uses lacked scientific evidence of therapeutic efficacy.”).
88 Some studies have reported higher rates of adverse events for off-label uses than on-label
ones—rates that increase as the evidentiary support for the off-label use decrease. See, e.g.,
Tewodros Eguale, David L. Buckeridge & Aman Verma, Association of Off-label Drug Use
and Adverse Drug Events in an Adult Population, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 55, 61 (2016)
(concluding based on a study comparing on-label adverse drug effects to off-label adverse drug
effects that off-label drug use increases the risk for adverse drug effects); see also CAVALLA,
supra note 86, at 9–10 (noting that increased risk for adverse drug reactions also applies to
younger pediatric patients and for psychiatric care).
89 See Eguale, supra note 88, at 61 (“Off-label drug use, and particularly off-label use
without strong scientific evidence, is a risk factor for [adverse drug effects].”).
90 See J.D. Momper, Y. Mulugeta & G.J. Burckart, Failed Pediatric Drug Development
Trials, 98 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 245, 245 (2015).
91 See CAVALLA, supra note 86, at 9, 13 (noting a lack of understanding of off-label use for
pediatric patients and reviewing prevalence of off-label use in pediatric practices and finding
rates as high as 76%).
92 See, e.g., Eguale, supra note 88, at 57 (including “age and measures of comorbidity” in a
study “because older patients and those with more than 1 comorbidity may have a higher risk
for” adverse drug effects (footnotes omitted)).
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problem.93 Because of these risks, and the costs associated with
improper prescriptions, almost every commentator discussing the
topic is concerned with the relative safety and efficacy of off-label
uses.94
The difficulty presented by off-label uses, as Ryan Abbott and Ian
Ayres note, results from an information deficit: because off-label
uses generally are not supported by the same evidence as approved
uses, patients taking a drug off-label may be exposed to risks
without knowing whether a drug is safe and effective.95 The problem
is exacerbated by features of patent law that fail to provide
adequate incentives to generate the clinical trial data needed to fill
this gap entirely.96 The result is the Problem of Off-Label Uses: offlabel use occurs necessarily and frequently, but there may be
insufficient information about the safety and efficacy of these uses.
In other words, there often may be insufficient information about
the type, frequency, and effects of off-label use.
Because the Problem of Off-Label Uses results from lack of
information, some scholars have proposed to solve it using more
data.97 Abbott and Ayres, for example, focus on a centralized, top93 See CAVALLA, supra note 86, at 12–13 (describing how in cases of depression, higher offlabel dosages may be used with the desire to ensure greater efficacy, but that use could cause
various safety issues).
94 See, e.g., Radley et al., supra note 16, at 1021 (“Although this practice provides a pathway
to innovation in clinical practice, it raises key concerns about risks to patients and costs to
the health care system.”); CAVALLA, supra note 86, at 13 (“In most cases . . . , adequate
research evidence to support off-label prescribing is lacking.”); Abbott & Ayres, supra note
19, at 388 (noting a lack of research for off-label uses).
95 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 19, at 388; Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical
Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label
Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 65 (2008) (“[T]he prevalence of off-label prescribing
is a manifestation both of learning patterns in the medical profession and deficiencies in the
production and dissemination of clinical knowledge.”); id. at 82–83 (noting that safety
concerns from lack of information are prevalent for all drugs, not just off-label uses); see also
Evans, infra note 124, at 439–50 (explaining that a drug’s safety and efficacy profile cannot
be known until the drug has been on the market for a sufficient period of time due to the ways
premarket safety trials are conducted); Louis Lasagna, Discovering Adverse Drug Reactions,
249 JAMA 2224, 2225 (1983) (stating that reporting by physicians after original FDA
approval is the most important way that drug manufactures and the FDA can learn about
long-term adverse drug effects).
96 See infra Sections III.A–B.
97 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 19, at 399. As noted below, not all proposals to curb offlabel use focus on this information deficit. See infra note 101; see also CAVALLA, supra note
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down approach that relies on the FDA to gather, police, evaluate,
and communicate information about off-label uses.98 This includes
the creation of a new labeling system.99 George Horvath argues for
a skinny version of Abbott and Ayres’ proposal, where the volume of
off-label sales triggers manufacturer obligations to disclose off-label
uses.100 Others, such as David Kwok and Mark Rodwin, view offlabel prescribing as a practice to be curbed and propose various legal

86, at 173–74 (arguing for higher professional standards, changing reimbursement
incentives, and tracking off-label outcomes); Muriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label
Medication Use, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 344, 345–46 (2009) (arguing that off-label use
should be regulated in the same manner as medical devices, using a two-step review process,
including a CMS National Coverage Determination, for drugs that are expensive and risky);
Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label
Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 1, 45–46 (2007) (canvassing a variety of approaches to curb off-label prescribing,
including a reimbursement ban, a prescription ban, preemption of product liability cases for
on- but not off-label uses, tax incentives and rebates for expanded indications, greater patent
exclusivity for on- and off-label uses, and mandating sNDAs for “for products the
manufacturer knows are being used in any significant off-label manner”); United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To minimize off-label use, or manufacturer evasion
of the approval process for such use, the government could create other limits, including
ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions.”).
98 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 19, at 399–412. (advocating for a new coding system for
off-label uses). Similar proposals with respect to labeling have been developed in other
countries as well. See, e.g., Hanbin Wu & Gao Wu, Strategy to Address Innovative Off-Label
Medication Use in China: Grading Management, 70 EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1271,
1272 (2014) (arguing for a five-category system to indicate the nature of the off-label
prescribing in China).
99 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 19, at 412–17 (providing an overview of the proposed
“tiered labeling system”). But it is not clear how much this would help. See CAVALLA, supra
note 86, at 11 (noting a recent study in the United States showing that “widespread ignorance
of what drugs were actually approved for”); Donna T. Chen, Matthew K. Wynia, Rachael M.
Moloney & G. Caleb Alexander, U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved Indications
and Evidence Base for Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National Survey, 18
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1099 (2009) (finding that physicians
misconstrue the meaning of FDA approval in determining a drug's efficacy for a certain use);
Johnson, supra note 95, at 79 (reviewing literature in which physicians ignore warning letters
and black box warnings).
100 George Horvath, Off-Label Drug Risks: Toward a New FDA Regulatory Approach, 29
ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCIS. 101, 127 (2020); see also Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 649, 652 (2011) (describing four categories of off-label use (OLU): “OLU justified by
high-quality evidence, OLU justified by some but not high-quality evidence, OLU justified by
the need or desire to innovate, and unjustified OLU”).
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mechanisms to put financial pressure on drug manufacturers to do
so.101 While each of these proposals has merit, they all approach the
Problem of Off-Label Uses as a standalone challenge. And they aim
to meet that challenge—however they frame it—by beefing up
existing regulatory frameworks. By doing so, they fail to capitalize
on the possibility of solving the Problem a different way, as well as
the opportunity to simultaneously address a different problem: the
Problem of New Uses.102
B. THE PROBLEM OF NEW USES

New uses of old drugs are sorely needed. Not only are R&D costs
for novel drug compounds increasing, but total investment in drug
development has also consistently declined since 1950.103 Both
101 See David Kwok, Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the
False Claims Act, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 185, 211, 220 (2017) (arguing for reimbursement caps
and noting that “[r]egardless of the precise optimal reimbursement rate, all reform proposals
hinge upon one critical piece of information: tying patient indication to the prescription”); id.
at 209, 219–20 (proposing using the False Claims Act’s civil liability claw-back mechanism to
lower drug prices for off-label prescriptions reimbursed under Medicare Part D, capping offlabel reimbursement “at a rate tied to the competitive, patent-protected market for treatment
of the condition”); Rodwin, supra note 78, at 659 (proposing making off-label prescribing more
expensive for manufacturers so that they will discourage the practice); see also Herbst, ShortSighted, supra note 80, at 4 (proposing a regulatory fix by requiring “diagnosis codes on claims
submitted for federal reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs under the Medicare
Part D and Medicaid programs”); Herbst, Medicare Part D, supra note 78, at 214, 223
(arguing that CMS should require diagnostic codes for all prescriptions as a condition of
reimbursement but not for coverage determinations).
102 While some legal scholars have noted in passing the innovative nature of off-label
prescribing, most proposals focus on restricting off-label prescribing to limit risks rather than
to capture and cultivate the effects of off-label prescribing when it occurs. See, e.g., Abbott &
Ayres, supra note 19, at 390–91 (contending that “[o]ff-label drug use . . . may also serve as a
pathway to innovation” and noting the failure to capture this information but focusing on
problems with current off-label use and marketing); Rodwin, supra note 78, at 659 (proposing
a limit to off-label prescribing by changing pharmaceutical firms’ economic incentives); Kwok,
supra note 101, at 188 (putting forth a proposal of a new “theoretical reimbursement
framework that eliminates this distortion and unfairness by capping off-label
reimbursements at a competitive level”); Horvath, supra note 100, at 127 (proposing that a
manufacturer should have a duty to disclose available clinical data “once off-label
prescriptions account for a certain volume or percentage of a drug’s total prescriptions”).
103 See Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency,
11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191 (2012) (showing that the number of new FDA
drugs approved “per billion US dollars of R&D spending in the drug industry has halved
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increased R&D costs and decreased spending on R&D reduce the
overall number of available new drugs.104 As investments in new
drugs become riskier, firms take fewer chances for higher returns.105
When investments are successful, they are expected to generate
large profits, which also translates into high drug prices.
With costs rising and investment declining, new uses of approved
drugs are particularly attractive. Compared to new drug
development, new use development is dirt-cheap.106 Thrift is made
possible by existing knowledge about how to manufacture the drug,
as well as information about its safety, toxicity, pharmacokinetics,
mechanism of action, and even its effect on gene expression, all of
which reduce the total investment required to bring the drug to
market.107 “Big Data” promises to reduce these costs even further
by screening various uses before they are tested in a lab or clinical
trial.108 But they are difficult to commercialize. Traditional means
of creating incentives for drug research and development—patent
monopoly and market exclusivity—do not work as well for new uses
of old drugs, giving rise to the Problem of New Uses.
This Section explains why. It shows that this problem, like the
Problem of Off-Label Uses, is also one of information. The problem
is not, in other words, that we don’t have the right tools; it’s that we
aren’t using them because we’ve relied on the wrong kind of entity
(the pharmaceutical company), or at least wrongly relied primarily
approximately every [nine] years since 1950” and that costs have been growing steadily ever
since). In a 2021 paper, Katherine Liddell and John Liddicoat show that government
investment in new uses has far eclipsed private sector innovation. See Johnathon Liddicoat,
Kathleen Liddell, Mateo Aboy & Jakob Wested, Has the EU Incentive for Drug Repositioning
Been Effective? An Empirical Analysis of the “+1” Regulatory Exclusivity,52 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 825, 826–27 (2021) (studying the effectiveness of European
incentives to marketing authorization holders to create new uses).
104 See Scannell et al., supra note 103, at 191 (“R&D efficiency, measured simply in terms
of the number of new drugs brought to market . . . has declined fairly steadily.”).
105 See id. at 193–94 (“Progressive lowering of the risk tolerance of drug regulatory agencies
obviously raises the bar for the introduction of new drugs . . . .”).
106 See Roin, supra note 26, at 4–5 (stating that developing a new drug costs an estimated
$1.2 billion while repurposing a drug only costs $300 million on average).
107 See id. at 5, 21, 42, 46 (contending that new use development is much quicker because
of the familiarity with the drug).
108 See, e.g., Sudeep Pushpakom et al., Drug Repurposing: Progress, Challenges and
Recommendations, 18 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 41, 55 (2019) (discussing the benefits
of big data).
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on that entity, to produce the needed information. To get there,
Subsections 1 and 2 briefly explain how patent law and market and
data exclusivity fail to incentivize R&D of new uses of old drugs.
Subsection 3 then explains how these two seemingly different
problems often arise because of the same informational deficit: lack
of information about the use and effects of drugs off-label.
1. Patent Law. Patent law, in particular, has played a critical role
in new drug pharmaceutical development. It encourages drug
development by dangling the prospect of a twenty-year legal
monopoly for any novel, useful, and non-obvious invention.109
Patent owners can use this to prevent others from making, using,
offering to sell, or selling the patented invention.110 In return,
inventors must disclose what they patented.111
Merely obtaining a patent on a novel drug compound isn’t, by
itself, enough to generate profit. That’s because drug companies
must first obtain FDA approval to market a drug. Without this
approval, a patented drug can’t be sold to consumers. Patents, in
other words, are options to commercialize the drug.112 Exercising
these options requires significant investment in research and
clinical trials—neither of which guarantees market success or even
market entry.113 Just to reach the market, the drug maker must use
this data to convince the FDA that the drug is safe and effective.114
Both the research and regulatory review process can last many
years, and most trials peter out before Phase III trials take place.115
109 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02(a), 103,154(a)(2); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (setting forth the requirements for patent infringement).
111 See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 3 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that patent law
offers “potential financial reward as an inducement to invent” and “to disclose technical
information”).
112 See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2007) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Underdeveloped Patent Prospects] (“[A]
patent provides its holder a series of options . . . [such as] a development option to
commercialize the invention.”); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real
Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127, 1137 (2009) (“[The] exclusive use of the invention allows the
patent holder to commercialize the invention and sell it at a supra-competitive price.”).
113 See infra Section III.B.
114 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
115 For a recent study that found that the mean time between beginning clinical trials and
market approval was 96.8 months (and 80.8 months from beginning clinical trials until
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At the same time, doctrinal pressures in patent law require
inventors to file their applications early.116 This means that drugs
aren’t normally approved for marketing until long after the filing
date of the underlying patent, shortening the “effective” term of the
patent.117 Partially for that reason,118 Congress enacted the HatchWaxman Act to extend patent terms, recapturing time lost during
the FDA’s review.119 At the end of the patent term, a generic
manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) to reach the market quickly, increasing competition and
lowering drug prices.120
Although this framework works well for some novel drug
development, it isn’t as conducive to stimulating R&D into new uses
for old drugs.121 One reason is doctrinal. Patent law’s doctrines
submission of an NDA), see DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra
note 62, at 24. This did not include earlier stages of drug development, including preclinical
research. Id. For earlier estimates, see, for example, Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug
Development in the United States from 1963 to 1999, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 286, 291 (2001).
116 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 518 (2009) (discussing the novelty doctrine); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of
the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351–52 (2007)
(discussing novelty and statutory standards).
117 See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 99 (2000) (“[E]ffective patent time is lost by
pharmaceutical products because of the long period that a new drug spends in clinical trials
and regulatory review.”).
118 See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 188 (1999) (detailing efforts by the
Carter and Reagan Administrations to address pharmaceutical patents).
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (setting forth guidelines for extending a patent term).
120 See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER BRANDED
MEDICINES LOSE EXCLUSIVITY IN THE U.S. (2016) (“measur[ing] price declines following loss
of exclusivity for every medicine that first became available as a generic between 2002 and
2014”).
121 Drug companies routinely file sNDAs for new indications, dosages, and patient
populations. See DiMasi, sNDAs, supra note 28, at 818 (noting the increase in new-use
approvals driven by new pediatric indications). But until recently, there was no data about
whether these supplemental filings are made by drug companies with patents or market
exclusivity over a use they are supplementing. See E-mail from Joseph DiMasi to David
Simon (Oct. 27, 2020, 5:41 PM) (on file with author). A recent study found that new
indications exclusivities are never added to the drug label after generics enter the market. See
Babak Sahragardjoonegani, Reed F. Beall, Aaron S. Kesselheim & Aidan Hollis, Repurposing
Existing Drugs for New Uses: A Cohort Study of the Frequency of FDA-Granted New
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aren’t equipped to protect all new uses.122 Even if drug
manufacturers do find and patent a new use, their reward is a
method patent, which is difficult to enforce.123 In some cases,
manufacturers have successfully used new-use method patents
covering an approved use of an existing off-patent drug to block

Indication Exclusivities Since 1997, 14 J. PHARM. POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 6 (2021). While this study
adds important information, it does not examine all new indications, only those that received
exclusivity. This information is critically important to understand just what effects patent
law and drug regulation have on the quantity, quality, and type of sNDA applications. While
the system may be working as intended, it is also possible that companies are using patent
law and market exclusivities to extend their economic monopoly by filing sNDAs toward the
end of the existing term of legal protection without conducting significant research. Data are
simply not available to analyze these questions.
122 The doctrines of novelty and nonobviousness present clear hurdles. See Abramowicz,
Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, supra note 112, at 1100 (discussing issues with the
nonobviousness doctrine); BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 352, 387
(D.N.J. 2018), appeal dismissed as moot, BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, 923 F.3d
1063 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding obvious the combination of abiraterone acetate and prednisone
to treat prostate cancer and reduce side effects); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., v. Roxane Labs.,
Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing the holding from Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and explaining that “the earlier patent
and FDA regulatory approval [depress] incentives for others” to investigate new uses).
123 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1014–
18, 1033–34 (2017) (discussing the downsides of method patents and reviewing relevant court
rulings). There are also public relations obstacles to enforcing method patents. See Sean B.
Seymore, Patenting New Uses for Old Inventions, 73 VAND. L. REV. 479, 499–501 (2020)
(“Method-of-use claims are difficult to enforce.”); Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, supra
note 25, at 724 (“[T]hese remedies are generally less satisfactory than an injunction that
would stop a competitor from making the product entirely.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role
of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2007)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Role of FDA] (characterizing method patents as “less valuable”).
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generic entrants.124 But until recently,125 these suits usually
required that the approved labeling read on a new use patent.126
Companies also attempt to extend their monopolies by “product-hopping”: patenting
new formulations, such as extended release, of the same drug to extend their existing
monopoly. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug
Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1134–36 (2019) [hereinafter Karshtedt,
Improvement Patents] (detailing the reformulation of the drug Namenda to prevent generic
entrants into the market); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Reform
and Drug Pricing (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4–5) (on file with author) (noting the
extended period of exclusivity resulting from pharmaceutical patenting practices). To obtain
product-hopping patents, drug companies will typically file a new NDA and use clinical trial
data to support safety and efficacy findings. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH.,
APPLICATION
NUMBER
22-525:
SUMMARY
REVIEW
(2010),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022525orig1s000sumr.pdf
(stating that a single clinical trial had been performed for Namenda XR). The FDA also
approved the drug subject to a small neurotoxicity study in female rats. Letter from Russell
Katz, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Michael Niebo,
Forrest
Labs.,
Inc.
(June
21,
2010),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022525Orig1s000Approv.pdf. But
because FDA approval is not comparative—because safety and efficacy are measured against
a placebo and another drug—the “new” drug may be clinically identical to the pioneer. See
Karshtedt, Improvement Patents, supra note 124, at 1140 (“The agency typically does not ask
the sponsor to furnish any data suggestive of clinical distinctiveness between a drug’s new
form and its previous one . . . .”); Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary
Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 419, 491 (2010) (noting that comparative study data rarely exist); Theodore W. Ruger,
After the FDA: A Twentieth-Century Agency in a Postmodern World, in FDA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 80–83 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015) (“FDA has codified by
longstanding regulation a policy of assessing efficacy against placebo controls.”).
125 Glaxosmithkline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2020),
rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn (Feb. 9, 2021), on rehearing, 7 F.4th 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (upholding a jury verdict of induced infringement of a method patent where the jury
found that promotion of the generic version of a brand name drug could infringe the method
patent covering the use of brand name drug where the generic drug manufacturer knows its
drug will be substituted for the brand name drug).
126 See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1058–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that recommended “downward titration” language on the label of an ANDA could
induce users to infringe a method patent covering a one-per-day use of the underlying drug
because some patients using the generic would, according to the label, necessarily have to use
the product once-per-day when titrating down to the lowest effective dose); Sanofi v. Watson
Labs. Inc., 875 F.3d 636, 645–646 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The content of the label in this case
permits the inference of specific intent to encourage the infringing use.”); Vanda Pharm. Inc.
v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom.
Hikma Pharm. USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharm. Inc., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020) (affirming the district
court’s finding of induced infringement). But see Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd.,
676 F.3d 1316, 1321–25 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reaffirming Warner-Lambert and finding no grounds
124
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Whenever that doesn’t happen—when the generic label simply
includes the off-patent use or doesn’t specifically require practicing
the new method127—it’s difficult, though now potentially easier than
in the past,128 to enforce a new use patent.129 So once the patent
protection of an existing drug lapses, generics can usually enter the
market by filing an ANDA. And once the generic enters the market,
doctors can prescribe the drug for any approved or unapproved use,
including patented new uses.
With only a modest threat of inducement actions, generics can
potentially free-ride on the innovative use.130 And there is very little
for inducement based on the labeling of the drug, where the allegedly infringing labeling
occurred in the “pharmacodynamics” subsection of the “Clinical Pharmacology” label and
federal regulations expressly provided that such sections did not indicate approved uses);
Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 194–95
(“Under current law, it can be very hard to establish that a generic company induced
infringement of a patent claiming a protected use omitted from the labeling.”). It is possible
to imagine contributory infringement for advertising off-label, on-patent uses. But this
situation doesn’t arise frequently because of limits on off-label advertising. Simon, Off-Label
Information, supra note 67, at 7–9.
127 This practice of “carving out” the infringing use, also known as “skinny-labeling,” is
permitted by law. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (allowing inclusion of “a statement that
the method of use patent does not claim” a use for which the applicant is seeking approval);
see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2020) (detailing rules for comparing proposed and
approved labeling for ANDAs).
128 A Federal Circuit panel recently reheard a case in which it affirmed a jury’s finding of
infringement under a seemingly looser evidentiary standard. See Glaxosmithkline LLC v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“It was fair for the jury to infer
that when Teva distributed and marketed a product with labels encouraging an infringing
use, it actually induced doctors to infringe.”).
129 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“Because Apotex is not submitting an application to sell a drug for . . . the only use covered
by the patent involved in this case, . . . Apotex is entitled to summary judgment . . . .”);
AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding
noninfringement based on the same reasoning in Warner-Lambert); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon
Lab’ys, Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (basing a finding of noninfringement on
Warner-Lambert); Bayer Schering Pharma, 676 F.3d at 1326 (finding noninfringement based
on the same reasoning in Warner-Lambert and Allergan).
130 See Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, supra note 112, at 1069–70 (“With the patent in
the public domain, any private party desiring to perform such scientific testing must also
consider the possibility that third parties will free ride on the information its tests produce.”).
The free-riding problem is not as much of a concern when a drug is brought to market under
an existing patent term because the patentee will have incentives, if not to develop, then at
least to market as many novel uses as possible. See id. at 1102‒03. This is a feature of drug
regulation that is often seen as a problem, rather than a benefit. Id. at 1070. But the free-
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pioneer drug companies can do about it.131 State laws requiring
generic substitution and insurance reimbursement rules132 also
reduce firms’ incentives to invest in R&D of new uses for approved
drugs whose patents have expired.133 If firms can’t exclude generics
from market entry through an off-patent drug with an on-patent
indication and doctors are free to prescribe drugs off-label, then a
pioneer will have no ability to charge supra-competitive prices.
Some new uses, in other words, will go undeveloped.
2. Market & Data Exclusivity. Patent law, it turns out, isn’t
currently incentivizing firms to adequately invest in unapproved
new uses of approved drugs. For some of the same reasons, patent
law is particularly bad at incentivizing other drugs, such as those
for rare diseases where the market is often too small to risk drug
development.134 To provide an incentive in cases where patent law

riding problem will exist as to post-patent and drug exclusivity terms for off-label uses. The
problem here is that no one has sufficient incentive to invest in persuasion (clinical trials)
because current prescribing practices enable generics to be used for off-label uses.
131 See infra notes 144‒147 and accompanying text.
132 States began enacting these laws in the 1970s. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M.
Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 43 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43, 49 (1979). Substitution laws, which all states have, take two forms. See New York
ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 644‒45 (2d Cir. 2015). “[T]he first type of
law specifies whether it is mandatory or permissive for a pharmacist to substitute a generic
bioequivalent. The second type of law regulates whether the pharmacist should assume the
patient’s consent for generic substitution, or if they must explicitly request consent.” Yan
Song & Douglas Barthold, The Effects of State-Level Pharmacist Regulations on Generic
Substitution of Prescription Drugs, 27 HEALTH ECON. 1717, 1718 (2018). States may have
either or both kinds of laws. See id. For more detailed rules about when and what drugs can
be substituted by whom, see generally Jesse C. Vivian, Generic-Substitution Laws, 33 U.S.
PHARMACIST 30 (2008). Importantly, as well, some states prevent insurers from refusing to
reimburse off-label uses. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(describing Tennessee’s statute prohibiting insurers from declining to pay for off-label uses);
see also James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76‒77 & n.56 (1998)
(discussing the policy guiding New Jersey’s statute requiring insurers to pay for off-label
uses).
133 See Roin, supra note 26, at 33‒35 (outlining how generic drugs can enter markets and
reduce pharmaceutical investments with off-patent indications); see also Warner-Lambert,
316 F.3d at 1359 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that indication-based exclusivity undercut its
market).
134 See David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What
Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 126‒27 (2000) (“[R]are diseases, with their small patient
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fails, Congress created various periods of regulatory “exclusivity”—
periods in which the FDA will not approve the same drug for the
same indication or will not allow competitors to use the successful
applicant’s data for its own application—for firms that develop and
seek approval of various drugs.135 Examples of some exclusivity
periods include seven years of market exclusivity for drugs treating
rare diseases,136 five years of data exclusivity for new chemical
entities (NCEs),137 three years of data exclusivity for new uses of
existing drugs,138 and 180 days of market exclusivity for the first
generic filer of an existing drug.139 This incentive is particularly
powerful for NCEs because the FDA will not approve any other drug
with the same active ingredient during the statutorily defined
period.140 With the market to itself, a drug company can recoup
investment costs and extract rents. Market exclusivity, in this way,
provides an incentive for drug development where patent law can’t
or won’t.
Although regulatory exclusivity is expressly designed to
incentivize R&D of new uses, it’s dysfunctional for two different
reasons. First, just as with orphan drugs, it’s often irrational to
pursue new uses—even with the prospect of three-year data
exclusivity—because there are better margins elsewhere.141 Firms
pursuing new uses may find smaller patient populations, less
serious diseases, and little patent protection. Although “back-end”
regulatory exclusivity helps mitigate the lack of patent protection,

populations, provided little or no economic incentive . . . to invest research dollars in search
of a cure whose development costs could not be recouped.”).
135 See Roin, supra note 26, at 10. I also refer to uses protected by market exclusivities as
“protected uses.” The EU has a similar approach for market and data exclusivity, but it
functions somewhat differently, though with similar null effect, for new uses of approved
drugs. See Liddicoat et al., supra note 103, at 826–27, 843.
136 The Orphan Drug Act of 1983, 21 U.S.C. § 360cc; 21 C.F.R. § 316.31 (2020). In 1997,
Congress sought to encourage clinical trials in pediatric populations by providing a six-month
patent term extension or market exclusivity to firms that successfully completed such studies.
21 U.S.C. §§ 355a(b)(1), (c)(1), 355c.
137 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).
138 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
139 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(v).
140 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2020).
141 See Rohde, supra note 134, at 125–28 (describing the rationale for market exclusivity
for orphan drugs).
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it is often not enough to induce firms to invest in new uses.142 Firms
are better off investing in drugs that have a wider consumer base
and a longer exclusivity period. Novel drug development, despite its
increased risks, pays much higher returns.143
Second, regulatory exclusivity, like ANDA approval, is indication
specific.144 A generic can file an ANDA for any approved use not
covered by a regulatory exclusivity.145 If the FDA approves that
ANDA, physicians can and will prescribe the drug for the protected
use.146 Because the FDA doesn’t prevent physicians from
prescribing the generic drug for protected uses, the generic use can

See Rohde, supra note 134, at 126 (detailing how the pharmaceutical industry “was
concerned more with making profits through rational business decisions” and, because new
drugs are more profitable and incentivized than new uses, the industry focuses R&D on new
drugs and therapies).
143 Perhaps even more profitable is extending the exclusivity of an existing drug through
various legal and market-based machinations. See Karshtedt, Improvement Patents, supra
note 124, at 1209–10 (contending that “there are reasons to believe that new use inventions
are under-incentivized under the current regime”).
144 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding
that the pioneer drug manufacturer is only granted three-year exclusivity for new indications
that it adds to the label itself and not for new indications added by other manufacturers);
Sigma-Tau Pharms., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that the
agency’s provision concerning exclusivity “of the same drug product for the same indication”
was reasonable under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (emphasis added)). The difference,
however, is that new uses can theoretically be enforced, while market exclusivities provide
for no private enforcement mechanism. See infra Part III; Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises for
Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 207 (2018) (arguing that Benjamin Roin’s
proposal isn’t workable because it requires private enforcement of market exclusivity). But
see Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, Market
Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 28–29 (2018) (noting
that a price increase of an existing drug after market exclusivity was granted for new orphan
indications). For orphan drugs there is another risk: a competitor drug can enter the market
because it is “clinically superior.” 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14)(i)–(ii) (2020) (creating an exception
in the definition of “same drug” that “if the subsequent drug can be show to be clinically
superior to the first drug, it will not be considered the same drug”); Berlex Lab’ys, Inc. v. Food
& Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19, 27 (D.D.C. 1996) (affirming FDA’s approval of a competitor
product under the Orphan Drug Act based on its clinical superiority).
145 This is true even if the generic changes the proposed dosage to better match the use still
subject to market exclusivity. See Spectrum Pharms., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 1062, 1066,
1067–68 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
146 The generic label must “carve out” any references to drugs currently under market
exclusivity. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2020). This results in a “skinny label.”
142
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erode the profits gained through regulatory exclusivity.147 This fact,
combined with mandatory state substitution laws, effectively
destroys the pioneer’s exclusivity. So the promise of regulatory
exclusivity often doesn’t incentivize the research and development
of new uses.
3. The Problem of New Uses as an Informational Problem. In
short, neither market exclusivities nor new-use patents will block a
generic from entering the market. Once the generic breaks into the
market, the pioneer has little incentive to seek FDA approval for a
new use because any such approval won’t provide market
exclusivity, or at least not any meaningful form of it. But even where
a new use is both patented and approved by the FDA, in most cases
the generic can avoid infringement by filing an ANDA for only noninfringing or unprotected uses. Firms, therefore, will be reluctant to
expend resources to develop new uses—either by filing new-use
patents or seeking market exclusivities for new uses.148 This, in a
nutshell, is the Problem of New Uses: how can the law incentivize
the discovery of new unapproved uses when patent law and drug
regulation can’t protect the inventor from free-riding?
This problem, in turn, is about the appropriate incentives
necessary to generate two kinds of information: information about
possible new use candidates and safety and efficacy information
about identified new uses.149 Most of the existing proposals tacitly
assume that these questions can be answered together, so their
solutions assume that fixing market incentives for pharmaceutical
companies will solve both informational Problems. One group of
147 See Spectrum Pharms., 824 F.3d at 1066, 1068 (holding plausible the FDA’s
interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(12), (14), which explains that the exclusivity periods
apply to the “same drug for the same use or indication” and states that “[s]ame drug
means: . . . a drug that contains the same active moiety as a previously approved drug and is
intended for the same use as the previously approved drug,” to allow carve outs and varied
generic dosages resulting in ANDA approval).
148 To the extent it generates new use patents despite this is a curious phenomenon. If the
patentee can’t recoup costs or extract rents, then the patentee has effectively wasted her
money. At the same time, this creates a positive spillover, one that simultaneously achieves
and undermines the entire purpose of patent law: it excludes from the world a method that
all physicians and patients are free to use. But see Karshtedt, Improvement Patents, at 1178–
91 (arguing that by “product hopping” pharmaceutical companies extend patents to maintain
market power once the primary patent protection expires without adequate evidence that
supports a switch).
149 This distinction is explained in more detail infra Section II.C.
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scholars thinks the real problem is not with the laws but with their
enforcement. Patent law and market exclusivities, in other words,
could prevent free-riding, but only if they are enforced differently.
Erika Lietzan, for one, argues that the solution is to bolster the
doctrine of contributory infringement and FDA rules to enable
better enforcement.150 Benjamin Roin, on the other hand, thinks
that better enforcement is a matter of better information.151
Currently drug companies don’t have access to information about
when physicians are prescribing drugs off-label. If they did, drug
companies could enforce their new-use patents. In other words,
what’s problematic about new uses is not a gap in the patent or drug
laws, but one in information.
New uses, it’s true, can be found by drug companies. But they
can be—and often are—found by other actors, like physicians.152
More recent work by Sam Halabi on the secondary use market has
shown that enforcement-centered proposals miss a substantial part
of innovative activity and are, therefore, unlikely to solve the
Problem of New Uses entirely.153 Halabi’s research shows that
repurposing occurs through a variety of direct and indirect
mechanisms, including off-label marketing, serendipity, directed
research, and private-academic partnerships.154 Crucially, however,
this scholarship—whether focused on the enforcement of traditional
legal tools or the alternative ecosystem for new uses—doesn’t
directly tie the Problem of New Uses to the one of Off-Label Uses.

150 Lietzan, Paper Promises, supra note 144, at 195–204, 208–09 (detailing the difficulty in
pursuing private action against generic drug companies and contending that “[t]he problem
is not that the patent and regulatory exclusivity statutes are poorly drafted” then explaining
how to strengthen federal law and contributory infringement as potential solutions to
infringement).
151 See Roin, supra note 26, at 59–60 (addressing different strategies to solve the problems
raised herein but ultimately focusing on the use of informational technology, such as tracking
de-identified patient prescribing and medical records, to enforce new-use patents).
152 See Halabi, supra note 144, at 30 (listing academic researchers, clinicians, and
pharmaceutical firm researchers as drivers of new drug indications). Halabi also notes,
importantly, that firms reached for patent law by moving one step backwards in the chain of
drug development: patenting the method of finding new uses itself. See id. at 37.
153 See id. (discussing the secondary use market as a source of patent activity).
154 See id. at 30, 32, 36 (describing serendipitous discovery, big data and in silico screening,
and industry-university partnerships).
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C. THE COMMON INFORMATIONAL OVERLAP

While the Problems of New Uses and Off-Label Uses seem
different, they are actually the same problem. The information
needed to validate a new use—to determine whether it is safe and
effective for a given use—is the same information needed to validate
an off-label use. That’s because any new use of an approved drug is
an off-label use. In other words, safety and efficacy information
about new uses is also safety and efficacy information about offlabel uses.
The converse is also sometimes true. Off-label uses may turn out
to be new. Validating these off-label uses, then, will also validate
the new uses. Identifying a new use, however, is a task that can
occur only for uses that are new.155 And this excludes a large portion
of drugs prescribed off-label. To put things another way, the
Problem of New Uses is concerned with both identification and
validation; the Problem of Off-Label Uses is concerned only with
validation. The fact that both Problems are about substantially the
same information suggests that a single informational remedy could
solve both Problems.156
Despite this fact, most solutions to either Problem tend to ignore
it. Because scholars view each problem as distinct, their solutions
tend to focus on entities that are unlikely to be able to solve them.
For off-label uses, this means increasing government regulation to
limit the practice. Predictably, most scholarship in this camp
emphasizes the drawbacks of off-label prescribing rather than its

155 Just how “new” an off-label use must be for it to be considered “new” is a matter of
definitional hair splitting. The National Center for Advancing Translation Sciences (NCATS)
Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules program (New Therapeutic Uses
Program), for example, attempts to “accelerate the pace at which discoveries are turned into
new preventions, treatments and cures for human diseases.” About New Therapeutic Uses,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATION SCIS., https://ncats.nih.gov/ntu/about (last visited
Mar. 3, 2022). The program is principally focused on repurposing drugs for undiscovered or
unidentified new uses, not researching and developing existing off-label uses with insufficient
safety and efficacy data. See id. But “new uses” might simply refer to existing off-label uses
without sufficient safety and efficacy information.
156 Some subsets of new uses are not problems to be solved but rather are solved problems.
Currently firms do file sNDAs over some new uses. See infra Part III. For these approved
new uses, existing incentive structures seem to be working to both identify and generate R&D
for the new uses. See infra Part III.
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innovative potential.157 Besides squelching potentially innovative
activity, discouraging off-label use also has another unintended
consequence: it decreases the total amount of information about the
incidence, nature, and effects of off-label use. This poses a real
problem for any solution that seeks more information about off-label
uses.
New uses, on the other hand, are seen as a problem for
pharmaceutical companies to solve. All they need are the right
incentives. Unfortunately, scholars have yet to identify them. But
even if they could find proper incentives, both Problems would still
remain. That’s because increased R&D of new uses by
pharmaceutical companies won’t necessarily lead to more public
knowledge of either identification or validation of new uses—or even
to a large number of developed new uses. For one thing, there are
simply too many potential new uses to investigate. For another, not
all new uses, even if developed, will be profitable. Additionally,
competition concerns may drive large firms to keep new uses secret.
More than that, however, a firm-based solution ignores the fact that
physicians, not just firms, identify and prescribe many new uses.158
It also overlooks the large caches of information about off-label uses
generated by other parties, such as payers and, as argued in the
next Part, providers.

157 See Rodwin, supra note 78, at 654–55 (discussing the drawbacks of off-label
prescriptions, including undermining the FDA’s mission to regulate the drug market and
protect patients).
158 The problem here is that physicians don’t communicate their innovations because there
are limited incentives for them to do so. Eric von Hippel, Harold DeMonaco & Jeroen P.J. de
Jong, Market Failure in the Diffusion of Clinician Developed Innovations: The Case of OffLabel Drug Discoveries, 44 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 128 (2017). For a recent attempt to correct
this market failure, see supra note 179. Legal obstacles to some effective modes of
communication exacerbate this market failure in information diffusion. See Simon, supra
note 67, at 14, 17 (explaining legal and practical challenges of the current FDA approach to
off-label information dissemination); Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First
Amendment Right to Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1022 (2017) (noting
that the NDA and sNDA processes eliminate advertising for off-label uses, which means
“physicians must rely on peer-reviewed articles and anecdotes from other physicians to learn
about new [off-label] uses, rather than on company promotional efforts”).
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III. PROVIDERS AS A TOOL TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF NEW
AND OFF-LABEL USES
Solving both the Problems of Off-Label and New Uses requires
recognizing that they are substantially the same informational
problem. This Part proposes to fill the common informational hole
by targeting the entities that are in a unique position to, or that
already, collect data on, evaluate, research, or modulate off-label
uses: providers—hospitals, healthcare networks, and even small
physician practices. Not all providers, of course, are the same. Large
academic medical centers may be more likely to conduct clinical
trials than small physician-based practices. Insofar as providers
have the capability to do any of these activities, they are not the
only relevant entities. As others have pointed out, payers like
insurance companies also have capabilities and pertinent
information that could assist in generating the information needed
for better drug regulation.159
But no one has yet made the case for providers. This Part does
so. It explains why targeting providers is likely to produce
actionable information that can mitigate or solve both Problems.
Section A details provider infrastructure, such as electronic health
records and digital prescribing systems, that can track prescriber
and patient off-label activity. Sections B and C then show that
providers have institutional features that make them ideal loci for
information generation, analysis, and diffusion. This sometimes
includes institutional infrastructure or organizational units that
systematically track and monitor off-label uses (e.g., digital
prescribing software and pharmacy and therapeutics committees),
conduct clinical trials and observational studies (e.g., institutional
review boards, trained and experienced personnel, and research
support), and diffusion (e.g., marketing departments, research
output, and know-how). Section D concludes by exploring how
provider-based incentives dovetail with the FDA’s new program
159 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Price, supra note 45, at 19 (calling notice to “demand side”
innovation and remarking that payers may help curb unsafe and less effective off-label use
because they have both an incentive to provide cheaper care and the access to some of the
relevant information); Rachel E. Sachs, Promoting Demand-Side Innovation: Prizes for
Payers, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 391, 391 (2017) (diving into the active role insurance companies
may take in the innovation process).
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(RWE Program), which is considering how it can use so-called “realworld evidence” “to help to support the approval of a new indication”
for a previously-approved drug.160
A. DATA COLLECTION AND ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS

Providers already have access to voluminous amounts of
information about patients, including their prescriptions and
diagnoses. Health care providers increasingly use digital
information systems for at least some aspect of their practice. As
part of the Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs,
explained below,161 almost all hospitals,162 and large percentages of
other providers,163 have adopted EHRs. Most providers now collect
basic information about all of their patients in digitized form,

21 U.S.C. § 355g. The FDA has already begun promoting the integration of clinical trials
into practice settings. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FRAMEWORK FOR FDA’S REAL-WORLD
EVIDENCE
PROGRAM
10–11
(2018)
[hereinafter
FDA
RWE
FRAMEWORK],
https://www.fda.gov/media/120060/download; Barbara J. Evans, The Future of Prospective
Medicine Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, in Ruger, supra
note 124, at 96–100 (detailing the evolution of processes that have been in place to collect
real-world evidence).
161 In April 2018, the CMS changed the program name from “EHR Incentive Programs” to
“the Promoting Interoperability Programs.” Promoting Interoperability Programs, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms (last visited Apr. 23, 2022). Related programs
also exist. E.g., ACT NETWORK, https://www.actnetwork.us/national (last visited Apr. 23,
2022) (explaining that the “ACT Network is a real-time platform allowing researchers to
explore and validate feasibility for clinical studies” funded by the National Institutes of
Health that seeks to share EHR among providers participating in clinical trials and currently
claims to have over 150 million patient records).
162 See Julia Adler-Milstein & Ashish K. Jha, HITECH Act Drove Large Gains in Hospital
Electronic Health Record Adoption, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1416, 1419, 1421 (2017) (exploring the
large percentages of HER adoptions in hospitals); see also 2018 Medicare Electronic Health
Record (EHR) Incentive Program Payment Adjustment Fact Sheet for Hospitals, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/factsheets/2018-medicare-electronic-health-record-ehr-incentive-program-payment-adjustmentfact-sheet-hospitals (“We note that over 96% of eligible hospitals are meaningful users.”).
163 Chun-Ju Hsiao & Esther Hing, Use and Characteristics of Electronic Health Record
Systems Among Office-based Physician Practices: United States, 2001-2012, 111 NAT’L CTR.
HEALTH STAT. DATA BRIEF 1, 1–8 (2012), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db111.pdf
(showing that EHR increased among office-based physicians from 18.2% in 2001 to 71.8% in
2012).
160
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including prescriptions, diagnoses, and patient histories.164 Not only
do providers already collect some of the needed information, but
their use of EHRs also makes collecting additional information
about off-label uses—and creating data fields for that new
information—easier than developing a new (software) system from
scratch. While new data collection and organization may increase
demands on software and marginally increase short-term costs,
data collection itself should be relatively simple with low fixed costs.
Using existing EHR systems—and building them out—could also
capture innovative off-label uses by, for example, allowing (or
creating incentives for) physicians to flag uses that they think are
new. Software systems could also capture various features of the
new use that might enable researchers to identify the conditions
under which new uses are likely to be discovered and, if discovered,
when they are likely to be safe and effective.
B. INSTITUTIONAL BODIES AND EXPERTISE

All providers have the ability to collect certain kinds and
quantities of information about off-label use. Many, as noted above,
could leverage this capacity to collect information about off-label
and new uses that they initiate simply by practicing medicine.
Large providers, in particular, have the ability to collect more data
and in a more systematic and nuanced way than smaller providers.
Some, in fact, already have an institutional body designed to collect
and analyze information about drug prescriptions, use, and effects:
the Pharmacy and Therapeutics committee (P&T committee).165

164 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 495.20(d)(1)(i) (2020) (computerized provider order entry), (d)(2)
(drug interactions and allergy checks), (d)(3) (diagnosis information), (d)(4) (e-prescribing),
(d)(5) (indication tracking), (d)(6) (medication allergy list), (d)(7) (demographics), (d)(8) (vital
signs), (d)(9) (smoking status), (d)(10) (clinical quality measurements), (d)(11) (tracking
clinical compliance), (d)(12) (patient record copies), (d)(13) (patient clinical summaries),
(d)(14) (information exchange), (d)(15) (privacy protections).
165 Hospitals first established P&T committees in 1936. See Robin Feldman, The Devil Is
in the Tiers, 8 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7–8 & n.30 (2021). They became requirements for Joint
Commission accreditation in 1965. Id. The Joint Commission accredits hospitals both
independently and for Medicare and Medicaid. See infra notes 166, 168, 244.
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A hospital’s P&T committee develops a “formulary” of drugs that
the provider uses to determine which drugs to dispense.166 The
formulary represents the judgment of the institution’s medical staff
about the safety and efficacy of various drugs.167 The P&T
committee also evaluates and monitors the use of medications;
collects information about adverse events, reporting, and
medication errors; and develops “clinical care plans” and
guidelines.168 At more sophisticated providers, the P&T committee
is the primary liaison between the pharmacy and the medical
staff.169 Various subcommittees report and make recommendations

See David Shulkin, Reinventing the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, 37 P&T
623, 623 (2012) (“[T]he P&T committee has the overarching goal of ensuring the safe,
appropriate, and cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals.”). In 2008, the influential American
Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) published guidelines for institutions seeking
to establish a formulary and P&T system. See Christy Ciccarello et al., ASHP Guidelines on
the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee and the Formulary System, 78 AM. J. HEALTHSYS. PHARM. 907, 915 (2021) [Ciccarello, ASHP Guidelines]. It also offers accreditation for
those that conform to its guidelines. See id. at 907. This accreditation, however, is not an
approved Medicare accreditation under 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb or 42 C.F.R. § 482 et seq. See id.
at 907, 913. For an in-depth review on how the formulary system works at a large medical
center, see David B. Nash, Mary L. Catalano & Cindy J. Wordell, The Formulary DecisionMaking Process in a US Academic Medical Centre:, 3 PHARMACOECONOMICS 22, 22–35 (1993).
There is considerable variation among hospitals both in the substantive content of
formularies and the processes by which they manage them. See Ellena Anagnostis, Cindy
Wordell, Yor Guharoy & Robert Beckett, A National Survey on Hospital Formulary
Management Processes, 24 J. PHARM. PRAC. 409, 410–11 (2011). Anagnostis, Wordell,
Guharoy, and Beckett, for example, found that although most institutions had written
policies for how medications’ additions to the formulary are requested and reviewed, they had
far fewer policies for formulary deletion. See id. at 411; see also Gordon D. Schiff et al., Drug
Formulary Decision-Making: Ethnographic Study of 3 Pharmacy and Therapeutics
Committees, 76 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 537 (2019) (noting that findings showed “wide
variations” in “discussions of new drug formulary requests”).
167 See Nash et al., supra note 166, at 23 (“[T]he medical staff of an institution, working
through the pharmacy and therapeutics committee, evaluates, appraises, and selects . . .
those [drugs] that are considered most useful to patient care.”).
168 Ciccarello, ASHP Guidelines, supra note 166, at 908; see also Nash et al., supra note 166
at 23, 25 (explaining the structure and function of P&T committees); Darryl S. Rich,
Pharmacies’ Noncompliance with 2009 Joint Commission Hospital Accreditation
Requirements, 67 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 144, 144–45 (2010) (explaining the various
ways in which P&T committees may add a drug to the formulary either because of an FDAapproved labeling or because the P&T committee has determined it should be added).
169 Nash et al., supra note 166, at 25.
166
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to the P&T committee, which then makes recommendations to the
medical staff and administration of the provider.170
Some providers, in other words, have a built-in infrastructure to
generate, collect, monitor, analyze, and operationalize information
about off-label uses171—and to do so at a level of granularity not
normally available elsewhere. At one provider, the P&T committee
will do all of the following in a ten-month cycle: “evaluate 45 new
drugs for formulary addition, review 3 therapeutic classes of drugs,
discuss 150 adverse events, . . . review 10 drug use evaluations,” and
“review[] the medical staff policies regarding the prescribing and
dispensing of medications in the institution.”172 Put differently, P&T
committees are a significant source of information about off-label
use that is currently underutilized.173
P&T committees not only have expertise in evaluating drugs, but
they also have unique information about innovative new uses.
Physicians may request a new addition to the formulary—and that
new addition may be an innovative off-label use. While not all
innovative new uses will take place at providers with P&T
committees, they all will take place at a provider. Regardless of
whether the physician works in a hospital with a P&T committee or
a small practice, she has limited incentives to both collect
information about and disseminate any discovered new use.

Id. at 24–25.
This framework has been used to evaluate pre-1938 drugs that the FDA wants to test
for efficacy and safety. Colleen M. Culley, Beth Ann Carroll & Susan J. Skledar, Formulary
Decisions for Pre-1938 Medications, 65 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 1363, 1364–66 (2008).
When Congress passed the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, it grandfathered in drugs
that had been sold prior to 1938. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR STAFF AND INDUSTRY: MARKETED UNAPPROVED DRUGS
COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE, SEC. 440.100,11 (2011). The FDA evaluated drugs approved
between 1938 and 1962 in its Prescription Drug Wrap-Up. Id. at 11.
172 Nash et al., supra note 166, at 25.
173 Federal regulations also require Medicare Part D sponsors that use formularies (graded
pricing mechanisms) to create a P&T committee develop and implement them. 42 C.F.R §
423.120(b) (2020). All Part D sponsors use formularies to decide which drugs to reimburse.
Although, theoretically, this process is designed to reduce drug spending, it has, in practice,
led to significant price distortions and increases. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY,
& SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 39–42
(2019) (“Medicare health insurance plans may create incentives in certain circumstances for
higher drug prices.”).
170
171
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While P&T committees may have information but lack incentives
to disseminate it, the providers where they’re located typically have
other infrastructure that could do so rather efficiently.174 Academic
medical centers and hospitals, for example, have institutional
resources allocated to marketing, publication, and dissemination of
various kinds of information (e.g., research, promotional material).
Some also have students, graduate students, administrative staff,
compliance departments, and marketing officers. All of these
institutional resources make academic medical centers and (larger)
hospitals well placed to disseminate whatever information they
collect and analyze. Large healthcare networks with smaller
embedded healthcare practices—like NorthShore University
HealthSystem,175 Mass General Brigham,176 and Health
Partners177—have similar advantages.
Small providers, which constitute almost half of all medical
practices, face different challenges.178 They are, for example, less
174 The growing body of medical networks—such as Partners Healthcare (Massachusetts),
Northshore (Illinois), and Health Partners (Minnesota)—impose P&T requirements on
providers in their networks. See infra notes 175–177. As consolidation in HealthCare services
increases, so does the potential for standardizing these collection, organization, and analysis
of off-label use.
175 This includes five hospitals in the Chicagoland area, including a “900 physician
multispecialty group practice.” Organizational Profile, NORTHSHORE UNIV. HEALTHSYSTEM,
northshore.org/about-us/organizational-profile/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
176 Until 2019, this entity was known as Partners Healthcare. See Our Story, MASS
GENERAL BRIGHAM, https://www.massgeneralbrigham.org/who-we-are/our-story (last visited
Apr. 23, 2022). The organization includes “16 member institutions that encompass a range of
health care organizations. In addition to our academic medical centers, these include top-tier
specialty hospitals, community hospitals, a rehabilitation network, a health insurance plan,
a physician network, a teaching organization, and many locations for urgent and community
care.” Id.
177 HealthPartners is “the largest consumer governed nonprofit health care organization in
the nation – serving more than 1.8 million medical and dental health plan members
nationwide. Our care system includes a multi-specialty group practice of more than 1,800
physicians that serves more than 1.2 million patients.” Our History, HEALTHPARTNERS,
https://www.healthpartners.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2022). HealthPartners also runs
an “Institute” that conducts clinical research. See Research, HEALTHPARTNERS INST.,
https://www.healthpartners.com/institute/research/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
178 Carol K. Kane, Updated Data on Physician Practice Arrangements: For the First Time,
Fewer Physicians Are Owners than Employees, AM. MED. ASS’N 5, 13 (2019) (noting that “[i]n
2018, 56.5 percent of physicians worked in practices with 10 or fewer physicians” while 14.7
percent worked in practices with fifty or more physicians and the remaining 20.3 percent
working in practices between eleven and forty-nine physicians).
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equipped to collect granulated data and disseminate it to the same
extent as large providers. But they still may have valuable
information about innovative off-label uses, and capturing this
information, along with other off-label uses, is critical to solving
both problems.
The FDA and the National Institutes of Health’s National Center
for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) recently recognized
this in the context of innovative off-label use and have launched a
pilot program designed to correct the market failure in diffusion
noted above.179 While this recent initiative—which uses a
decentralized, voluntary reporting model—is an interesting and
positive development, it is designed to collect limited information
about innovative off-label uses; without additional incentives, it is
unlikely to solve both Problems.180 And, as explained in Part III, any
incentive structure that seeks to generate information about offlabel uses must be responsive to provider characteristics.
C. INSTITUTIONAL KNOW-HOW AND EXPERIENCE

In addition to resources, providers also have institutional knowhow. Many providers, for example, have experience conducting
clinical trials and observational studies.181 Sometimes providers
themselves initiate these trials and fund them publicly; other times

179 This program, known as CURE ID, allows physicians anywhere in the world to report
new uses to a government repository using a computer application. CURE Drug Repurposing
Collaboratory, CRITICAL PATH INST., https://c-path.org/programs/cdrc/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2022). It is part of a larger project between the FDA and NCATS to aid in “repurposing and
inform[ing] future clinical trials for diseases of high unmet medical need. The initiative
includes emerging/reemerging diseases, anti-microbial drug resistant infections, neglected
infectious diseases as well as rare oncology diseases where there are limited treatment
options.” Id. The drug is being pilot-studied with COVID-19. Id. Perusing the existing
application shows that activity is minimal but has potential with greater practice-integration,
data capture, and outreach. Id.
180 Presently, the focus is on collecting and disseminating information on innovative uses
of drugs to treat COVID-19.
181 See, e.g., Ruijun Chen et al., Publication and Reporting of Clinical Trial Results: Cross
Sectional Analysis Across Academic Medical Centers, BMJ (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.bmj.com/content/352/bmj.i637 (identifying 4,347 clinical trials at fifty-one
academic medical centers in the United States from 2007 to 2010); supra note 177 (discussing
HealthPartners Institute).
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providers partner with private industry.182 With greater incentives
to gather safety and efficacy information about off-label uses,
providers can capitalize on their existing knowledge base and skills
and potentially expand their capacity. The benefits of doing this
may extend beyond simply generating data: limited evidence
suggests that providers who engage in clinical trials are likely to
provide better care to non-trial patients.183
Despite the promise of both P&T committees and providers
generally as a source of information about both off-label and new
uses, there’s little information about how providers collect and
analyze information about off-label use, or if they do so at all. This
is true despite the information reporting requirements on many
providers.184 The limited data that exist show that only a small
number of providers have a policy in place to review off-label use,
let alone analyze potentially beneficial new uses.185 Providers that
have policies lack incentives to share this information with outside
providers or health care professionals.186 One is a problem of
generation, collection, and analysis. The other a problem of

182 Even smaller providers now have experience with clinical trials. E.g., Sean R. Tunis,
Daniel B. Stryer & Carolyn M. Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of
Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1627
(2003) (explaining that practical clinical trials take place in diverse clinical settings, which
often include community-based clinics).
183 See Sumit R. Majumdar et al., Better Outcomes for Patients Treated at Hospitals That
Participate in Clinical Trials, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 657, 659 (2008).
184 Besides its meaningful use criteria, supra note 162 and accompanying text, Medicare
requires all of its certified institutional providers to “submit an annual cost report.” Cost
Reports, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-Files/Cost-Reports (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(providing general cost report information and the cost reports of prior years); 42 C.F.R. §
413.20 (2020) (describing cost reports and their requirements).
185 See Anagnostis et al., supra note 166, at 413 (noting variable formulary addition
practices and that “(31%) of [the] 52 [responding] institutions[in the survey] have a policy
and/or procedure for approving a medication for an off-label indication”).
186 See, e.g., Kathleen Liddell, David A. Simon & Anneke Lucassen, Patient Data
Ownership: Who Owns Your Health?, 8 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 47 (2021) (explaining that
granting healthcare providers property rights over patients’ data does not necessarily
encourage sharing access to data across jurisdictions); Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About
Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 103–04 (2011) (discussing the high costs and
many disadvantages of developing a centralized, national database containing individuals’
complete medical history).
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diffusion. Providers, while currently not meeting either of the
challenges, could do so with the right incentives.
D. THE FDA’S REAL WORLD EVIDENCE PROGRAM

All of these features—use of EHRs, along with institutional
expertise knowledge, know-how, and experience—make providers
an important source of information about off-label use. But there is
another reason for tapping the information they have about new
and off-label uses: providers will be significant sources of “real world
evidence” (RWE) that the FDA can rely upon to approve new uses
of previously-approved drugs. Real world evidence is evidence
derived from real world data (RWD): “clinical evidence regarding
the usage and potential benefits or risks of a medical product
derived from analysis of RWD.”187 RWE includes data from EHRs
(including test results), claims, pragmatic trials, and observational
studies.188 The term became important in 2016, when Congress, as
part of the 21st Century Cures Act, mandated that the FDA
“establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world
evidence” to approve new indications189 and to issue guidance to
industry on the topic.190
While the FDA intends to use more RWE in approving new
indications,191 it has noted that the task is not without significant
challenges, including data formatting, quality, and consistency (in
capture).192 As one example, the FDA notes that EHRs may not
record patient symptoms, either in response to medication or at the
conclusion of treatment, in a structured or standardized manner—
RWE Framework, supra note 160, at 29.
See Liddell, supra note 186, at 6 (detailing how health information can be generated by
a typical check-up); RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 5, 11 (identifying examples of real
world evidence).
189 21 U.S.C. § 355g(a).
190 21 U.S.C. § 355g(e)(1). In response to this congressional mandate, the FDA published
its framework in 2018 and issued draft guidance in 2019. See RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note
160, at 3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS USING REAL-WORLD DATA
AND REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO FDA FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS, DRAFT GUIDANCE (2019).
191 See RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 13.
192 See id. at 15–17; Dr. Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay, in NCATS Meeting, supra note 30, at
60–61 (noting that validating clinical data is difficult because it may be collected sporadically
or in many different forms, citing an example from the Sentinel Initiative where “there were
70 different ways to represent a single, very simple platelet count”).
187
188
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or at all.193 Claims data, too, may exclude important metrics such as
symptom severity and disease response.194
Many, but not all, of these problems result from the manner in
which providers (or payers) collect information. Incentives that
induce providers to generate off-label information can, as shown
below, also be structured to mitigate or eliminate some of the
challenges of using RWD and RWE.195 Obtaining good information
about off-label use, for example, requires some minimum amount of
data in a uniform format. The same information is required to make
assessments about the effects of off-label and new uses. Giving
providers incentives to produce this information not only generates
more useful, complete, and reliable information about off-label and
new uses but also is a source of potential evidence that can be used
to add a new indication to the drug label. This may be crucial if new
approval pathways, such sua sponte FDA label changes or citizen
petitions, are used. In sum, providers are capable of both generating
information about new and off-label uses and compiling it in a
format likely to qualify as RWD. What providers lack, however, are
the incentives to do so. The next Part explains some of the potential
incentive choices.

IV. INCENTIVES
This Part evaluates several potential incentives that could
induce providers to capture and develop actionable data about offlabel and new uses. The goal of this Part isn’t to argue for any
particular incentive or to show how every incentive might apply to
providers. It is, instead, to show that incentives can induce
providers to generate, collect, analyze, and disseminate information
about off-label and new uses. For this reason—and because space is
limited—this Part uses four examples to illustrate how provider
incentives could work. One, described in Section B, is an existing
government program designed to encourage providers to adopt
EHRs. Section C then proposes a new incentive—market
inclusivity—that would pay providers directly for implementing
See RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 17.
See id. at 17–18.
195 See id. at 25 (discussing how the FDA will assess data standards and implementation
strategies to ensure that RWD and RWE are central to drug development).
193
194
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systems to track, organize, and publish data on off-label uses.
Section D examines how a traditional push incentive, tax credits,
could induce providers to engage in validation of off-label uses.
Finally, Section E considers how altering the FDA approval process
and regulatory exclusivity might further incentivize providers to
conduct validation on off-label uses. Before exploring any of these
incentives in detail, Section A explains the incentives traditionally
used to stimulate pharmaceutical development.
A. INCENTIVES GENERALLY

Stimulating providers to collect, analyze, and disseminate
information about off-label uses requires incentives. This, one will
notice, is the same task typically performed by pharmaceutical
companies. It is therefore reasonable to consider how the same suite
of incentives used to stimulate pharmaceutical companies to engage
in information generation can be applied to providers. These
incentives fall into two categories. First, push or ex ante incentives
are supply-side incentives that subsidize research: government
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grants,196 public-private partnerships,197 and tax benefits.198
Second, pull or ex post incentives are demand-side incentives that
create a viable market for drug discovery: prizes,199 patents, and
regulatory exclusivity.200

196 The U.S. government funds clinical trials through various agencies, including the
National Institutes of Health (NIH); National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI); the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the FDA; and the CMS. See Robert M.
Califf, Deborah A. Zarin, Judith M. Kramer, Rachel E. Sherman, Laura H. Aberle & Asba
Tasneem, Characteristics of Clinical Trials Registered in ClinicalTrials.gov, 2007–2010, 307
JAMA 1838, 1841 tbl.1 (2012) (noting that the NIH funded around only 9% of all studies in
ClinicalTrials.gov); Pearl A. McElfish, Rachel S. Purvis, M. Kathryn Stewart, Laura James,
Karen H. Kim Yeary & Christopher R. Long, Health Research Funding Agencies’ Policies,
Recommendations, and Tools for Dissemination, 12 PROG. CMTY. HEALTH P’SHIP, 473, 475–78
(2018) (describing the funding policies of CDC, CMS, FDA, and NIH grants); David Gordon,
Wendy Taddaei-Peters, Alice Mascette, Melissa Antman, Peter G. Kaufmann & Michael S.
Lauer, Publication of Trials Funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 369
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1926–34 (2013) (conducting “an extensive evaluation of the publication of
the results of NHLBI-funded trials of cardiovascular interventions”); ORPHAN PRODUCTS
CLINICAL
TRIALS
GRANTS
PROGRAM,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/industry/about-orphan-products-grants (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(describing the Orphan Products Clinical Trials Grants Program). The NIH currently funds
some clinical trials for new uses of approved, off-patent drugs, but the Director of NCATS at
the NIH notes that the “NIH does not like to pay for these.” Dr. Christopher P. Austin, in
NCATS Meeting, supra note 30, at 5.
197 See, e.g., Templates for Success: Speeding the Formation of Public-Private Partnerships,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATION SCIS., https://ncats.nih.gov/pubs/features/ntutemplate (last visited Apr. 23, 2022); Rutger Daems, Edith Maes & Guy Nuyts, Advancing
Pharmaceutical R&D on Neglected Diseases: Valuing Push and Pull Economic Incentive
Mechanisms 10–12 (Maastricht Sch. Mgmt. Working Paper, No. 2013/11, 2013),
http://web2.msm.nl/RePEc/msm/wpaper/MSM-WP2013-11.pdf; Henry Grabowski, Increasing
R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 457, 463–64 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, eds. 2005).
198 See 26 U.S.C. § 45C (laying out the orphan drug tax credit conditions); 26 U.S.C. § 41
(stating tax credits for research activities). For further discussion, see infra Section III.B.3.
199 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT ch.5 1 (Stanford University Press)
(forthcoming), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Infection_Prizes.pdf (explaining how
a government prize system would incentivize pharmaceutical development and create a
market); see generally James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D
for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007).
200 Daems et al., supra note 197, at 12.
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While the traditional method for generating new drugs has been
dominated largely by patent law201 and regulatory exclusivity,202 it
would be unwise to assume that the same mix of incentives—or the
same incentives in exactly the same forms—will work for providers.
Providers and drug companies have fundamentally different
concerns, business models, and organizational structures. For
incentives to be effective, they must be mindful of these differences.
Determining the optimal set, form, and breadth of provider
incentives is beyond the scope of this Article. For that reason, the
remainder of this Part doesn’t attempt to explain the advantages
and drawbacks of every possible incentive. Instead, it uses four
examples to illustrate how incentives might induce providers to
collect information that they already have or have the ability to
produce. This information consists principally of either (1) existing
data about the nature, incidence, and effect of off-label use or (2)
data from observational studies and pragmatic or clinical trials.
Some incentives, as shown below, can apply to both types of
information, but they will have to be adjusted to ensure that they
generate the right kind of information in each case.
B. BUILDING OUT EXISTING GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

One way to incentivize providers to engage in a desired behavior
is to pay them.203 Congress used this strategy in 2009 to induce
201 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats,
and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 16, 18 (2008) (describing how patent law creates
incentives for pharmaceutical development).
202 See supra note 200.
203 There are other efforts to gather data, though. See, e.g., All-Payer Claims Databases,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/data/apcd/index.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2022) (describing the project to update and improve state claims data
from private insurance companies); Roxanne M. Andrews, Statewide Hospital Discharge
Data: Collection, Use, Limitations, and Improvements, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1273, 1273–
99 (2015) (describing Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) grants to states
to update statewide discharge databases with race-ethnicity data); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A
CONDITION OF COVERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT § V.A (2006)
(explaining that the CMS will provide coverage in some cases where there is “adequate
evidence to determine that an item or service is reasonable and necessary” but that further
evidence is needed that is not routinely available on claims forms); id. § V.B (explaining that
CMS will cover items where there is insufficient evidence to determine an item is reasonable
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providers to adopt EHRs,204 awarding subsidies (push incentives) to
providers,205 states,206 and Native American tribes.207 Payment was
conditioned on eligible providers adopting “meaningful uses” of
EHR.208 Meaningful uses was defined in detail, and the
requirements were phased in through three stages over five
years.209 Providers that hit the CMS benchmarks obtained the
subsidy;210 those that failed to do so received nothing and, as of

and necessary but where additional clinical data would aid in this determination, including
requiring “added safety, patient protections, monitoring, and clinical expertise”).
204 This was included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009,
part of which was the HITECH Act. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
& 42 U.S.C.) (enacting an economic stimulus package in response to the Great Recession).
205 See, e.g., ARRA of 2009 § 4101(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395w-4(o)) (detailing
meaningful use requirements and incentives); id. § 4101(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–
4(a)(7)) (detailing payment adjustments for physician services); id. § 4101(c) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (l)) (defining MA-affiliated eligible professionals); id. § 4102(a)(1) (codified
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(n)) (detailing hospital incentives for use of certified CHR technology); id.
§ 4102(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(l)(3)) (describing payment requirements for
inpatient hospital services).
206 See HITECH Act § 3013 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj–33). HITECH Act § 3014 (codified
at 42 USC § 300jj–34) (describing grants to Native American tribes).
207 HITECH Act § 3014 (codified at 42 USC § 300jj–34) (describing grants to Native
American tribes).
208 Eligible providers included physicians, Medicare advantage organizations, hospitals,
critical access hospitals, MA organizations for certain affiliated hospitals, and states
participating in Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4(o) (SSA § 1848(o)) (defining eligible
professionals); id. § 1395w–23(l) (SSA § 1853(1)) (detailing Medicare Advantage
Organizations for certain affiliated professionals); id. § 1395ww(n) (SSA § 1886(n)) (defining
eligible hospitals); id. § 1395f(l) (SSA § 1814(l)) (discussing payment to critical access
hospitals); id. § 1395w–23(m) (SSA § 1853(m)) (detailing MA organizations for certain
affiliated hospitals), 1396b(a)(3)(F), (t) (SSA 1903(a)(3)(F) & 1903(t)) (guiding states
participating in Medicaid). Physicians, for example, were eligible for either the Medicare or
Medicaid subsidy depending on whether they treated Medicare patients, or a certain volume
of Medicaid patients. Eligible physicians could then elect to receive a subsidy under either
program, but not both. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4(k)(3) (defining eligible professional);
Discussion on the Relationship Between a Stage 1 Meaningful Use Objective and Its
Associated Measure, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,437–38 (July 28, 2010) (noting initial election
with one-time ability to switch elections); id. at 44,438 (noting that hospitals can choose
between Medicare fee-for-service EHR incentive or the Medicare Advantage EHR incentive
and the Medicaid EHR incentive).
209 See infra note 205 (citing C.F.R.).
210 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(n)(3) (defining meaningful EHR user for hospitals and
noting that the HHS secretary will set the standard). Implementation rules are located at 42
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2015, were penalized.211 Eligible hospitals,212 for example, were
entitled to a $2,000,000 base payment with additional payments
determined by the number of patients discharged and a payment
cap of $6,370,400.213 Since 2015, providers that failed to meet the
“meaningful use” requirements had their Medicare payments
reduced.214
By the time the payments sunset in 2018,215 the federal
government had paid out around $25 billon under this program.216
C.F.R. § 495.20 (2020) (defining meaningful use objectives and measures for EPs, eligible
hospitals, and critical access hospitals (CAHs) before 2015); 42 C.F.R. § 495.22 (defining
meaningful use objectives and measures for EPs, eligible hospitals, and CAHs for 2015
through 2018); 42 C.F.R. § 495.24 (defining stage 3 meaningful use objectives and measures
for EPs, eligible hospitals and CAHs for 2019 and subsequent years).
211 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w–4(a)(7), 1395w–23(l)(4),1395ww(b)(3)(B)(ix)(I), 1395w–23(m)(4).
212 Not all hospitals were eligible; psychiatric, rehabilitation, long-term care hospitals were
ineligible. 42 C.F.R. § 412.23.
213 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(n)(2); EHR INCENTIVE PROGRAM, MEDICAID HOSPITAL INCENTIVE
PAYMENTS
CALCULATIONS
(2013),
https://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/downloads/mln_medicaidehrprogram_tipsheet_e
p.pdf; EHR INCENTIVE PROG. & CMS, MEDICAID HOSPITAL INCENTIVE PAYMENTS
CALCULATIONS (2013), https://www.cms.gov/RegulationsandGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MLN_TipSheet_MedicaidHos
pitals.pdf.
214 Medicare reduced payments by the 25% in 2015 (reporting period 2013), 50% in 2016
(reporting period 2014), and 75% in and after 2017 (reporting period 2015). See 2018
MEDICARE ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD (EHR) INCENTIVE PROGRAM PAYMENT ADJUSTMENT
FACT SHEET FOR HOSPITALS (2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2018medicare-electronic-health-record-ehr-incentive-program-payment-adjustment-fact-sheethospitals. “This payment adjustment is applied as a reduction to the applicable percentage
increase to the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) payment rate, thus reducing
the update to the IPPS standardized amount for these hospitals.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§
1395ww(b)(3)(B)(ix), 1395f(l)(4) (establishing downward payment adjustments under
Medicare, beginning with FY 2015, for eligible hospitals and CAHs that do not successfully
demonstrate meaningful use of CEHRT for certain EHR reporting periods); see also Ian Ayres
& Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1822 (2015) (arguing that penalties serve as a valuable incentive
tool, including in the medical provider context).
215 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, § 101(b)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 11410, 129 Stat. 87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305). Hospitals in Puerto Rico were an exception,
but the CMS made clear that “in no case may any Medicaid eligible hospital receive an
incentive after CY 2021 (§ 495.310(f), 75 FR 44319).” Changes for Hospitals and Other
Providers, 85 Fed. Reg. 58,966 (Sept. 18, 2020).
216 See supra note 214. One article suggests the amount paid out as of 2015 was $28.1
billion, but I could not validate that number. Stephen T. Mennemeyer, Nir Menachemi,
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This included over $8.6 billion to eligible providers,217 over $475
million to Medicare Advantage organizations,218 and over $15 billion
to eligible hospitals.219
While a price tag of nearly $4 billion per year seems expensive,
it was effective.220 Just how effective is another question. Research
shows that hospitals eligible for the subsidies adopted EHR at
greater rates than those that were ineligible. But the increase was
modest (16.5% adoption per year for eligible hospitals versus 5.5%
for ineligible hospitals) and had a more pronounced effect on forprofit hospitals than on not-for-profit hospitals.221 This effect,
however, didn’t appear to hold for ambulatory (outpatient) care
centers.222 Despite its uncertain effects, Congress decided to

Saurabh Rahurkar & Eric W. Ford, Impact of the HITECH Act on Physicians’ Adoption of
Electronic Health Records, 23 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 375, 375 (2016).
217 See EP Recipients of Medicare I Incentive Payments (ZIP) (File 1 of 2), CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/DataAndReports (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(showing calculations in 2012 equaling $2,851,324,173.83 and calculations in 2013 equaling
$2,568,028,821.01); EP Recipients of Medicare I Incentive Payments (ZIP) (File 2 of 2), CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/DataAndReports (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(showing calculations in 2014 equaling $1,890,620,970.41, in 2015 equaling $948,403,852.66,
and in 2016 equaling $422,403,778.59).
218 See Medicare Advantage Organization Providers Payments (ZIP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/DataAndReports (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(citing MAO incentive totaling $475,772,506.27).
219 See EH Recipients of Medicare EHR Incentive Payments (ZIP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVS.),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/DataAndReports (last visited Apr. 23, 2022)
(providing calculations of incentive payments totaling $15,182,882,175.39 from 2012 to 2016).
220 See Julia Adler-Milstein & Ashish K. Jha, HITECH Act Drove Large Gains in Hospital
Electronic Health Record Adoption, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1416, 1419, 1421 (2017) (finding
statistically significant differences between adoption rates of EHR by eligible hospitals
(16.5% per year) and ineligible hospitals (5.5% per year)); see also Daniel Walker, Arthur
Mora, Mollye M. Demosthenidy, Nir Menachemi & Mark L. Diana, Meaningful Use of EHRs
Among Hospitals Ineligible for Incentives Lags Behind That of Other Hospitals, 2009–13, 35
HEALTH AFFS. 495, 495–501 (2016) (finding that eligible hospitals grew their EHR from 4.5%
in 2009 to 44.3% in 2013 while ineligible hospitals rose only modestly during the same period
(psychiatric hospitals from 0% to just under 10%; rehabilitation hospitals from 1.3% to around
15%; and long-term care hospitals from 0.6% to around 12%)).
221 Adler-Milsten & Jha, supra note 162, at 1421.
222 Mennemeyer et al., supra note 216, at 376–77.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

55

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 5

756

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:701

continue the program but not the payments, folding the EHR
requirements into an existing CMS incentive system.223
The blueprint of the meaningful use program, or others like it,
could be used to stimulate providers to systematically collect,
organize, and disseminate information about off-label uses. Like the
meaningful use subsidy, an “off-label subsidy” would require a
system to capture, organize, and publish off-label uses.224 Whether
this subsidy should specify the precise infrastructure necessary to
generate this information is something Congress or federal agencies
should study.225 At a minimum, however, the off-label subsidy would
specify the kinds of information collected, the form in which it
should be collected, and the terms by which it should be
disseminated to a centralized government database, which should,
to the greatest extent possible, be made available to enterprising
third-parties and to the public at large.226 After a sufficient period
Many of the requirements for the subsidy, however, have been folded generally into the
Medicare Quality Payment Program (MQPP) and specifically into the Merit-Based Payment
System (MIPS). Centralized Partnership Audit Regime, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,968 (Aug. 18, 2018).
Under the MQPP, Medicare rewards of penalizes providers reimbursement based on their
compliance with MQPP requirements. See CHIP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 101(b)(1)(B), 123
Stat. 8, 11 (2009) (retaining meaningful use determinations for merit-based incentive
payments); 41 C.F.R. § 414.1415 (2020) (detailing the Merit-Based Incentive Payment
System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive).
224 “Publish” here does not necessarily mean publication in peer reviewed journals. It
means something closer to “making publicly available the information in a format that would
normally be accepted by a peer-reviewed journal.” This avoids the problem of studies that
journals are unlikely to publish confirming the null hypothesis.
225 One issue that should be studied is how much implementation costs are or should be
offset by existing EHR systems.
226 This proposal folds nicely into a noted area of concern for the FDA: how to generate
more reliable information that can be used to assess safety and efficacy. See FDA RWE
FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 16–17 (stating the importance of examining data relevance
to determine the full range of outcomes for studies on health ailments). It might also be an
opportunity for the FDA to make headway into specifying a uniform format for IEHR—a
problem that is particularly important as the FDA reviews more EHR information. Id. at 17–
18. Under the RWE Program, the FDA is also considering data standards for RWE. Id. at 25.
Making data available publicly raises privacy-related concerns under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996) (codified primarily in Titles 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code); 45 C.F.R. §
164.306 (2020). Most of these concerns, however, can be swept away under one of the many
exceptions to HIPAA protections, including disclosures required by law and for public health
activities and purposes. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)–(b). Any ancillary privacy-related concerns
could be addressed by the agency charged with collecting the information. One potential
223
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of time, the incentives for the off-label subsidy—like the meaningful
use subsidy—could be folded into the existing CMS payment
system.
Depending on the goals of the program, the off-label subsidy
might also address the structural changes needed to conduct
reliable prospective observational studies or pragmatic clinical
trials. The subsidy could specify payments for setting up and
conducting observational studies. Compared to clinical trials,
observational studies and pragmatic clinical trials are cheaper and
are more feasible for smaller, less sophisticated providers.227
Maintaining the knowledge infrastructure for these trials may be a
particularly important aspect of leveraging innovative new uses—
testing them out before running full-on clinical trials. Maintaining
provider incentives to continue observational studies, however,
might cost more than the meaningful use subsidy. Unlike the fixed
costs of adopting EHR, the fixed costs of conducting observational
studies are higher and do not decrease with the same effect as do
those associated with EHRs. If this strategy is pursued, it will
require commitment to a permanent and more expansive role for
the government in pharmaceutical drug development.
Using an existing government program has several benefits.
First, there is a ready-made framework on which to build. In the
course of constructing this framework, the CMS has acquired
specialized knowledge about how to implement subsidies, which
providers might respond to them, and how to close the existing
incentive gaps. Second, the subsidy appears to be relatively
successful, at least as to some providers.228 While it’s difficult to
extrapolate the effect of this subsidy to one directed at off-label use,
it’s not unreasonable to assume that a similar subsidy would have
similar effects. At the very least, then, providers would probably
seek the economic benefits of collecting information in the manner
specified by the law. And the benefit here is likely to be much
stronger than in the case of EHRs. In the context of EHRs,
remember, providers were already beginning to adopt the relevant
technology. But the issue for off-label uses is a collective action
solution, for example, would be to restrict access to information disclosed to the centralized
database, leaving only claims data completely publicly accessible.
227 See infra note 292.
228 See supra notes 203204.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

57

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 5

758

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:701

problem: providers are not converging on a uniform set of standards
for data collection and formatting. The subsidy would help to do so.
Finally, to the extent that some fixed costs involve technological
capacity or professional know-how, subsidizing those costs might
lower the total fixed costs over the long run.
With the meaningful use subsidy, the opposite worry arose
because not all providers were eligible to participate: driving down
the cost of EHR technology placed ineligible providers in a position
to purchase a lower-cost, inferior good. By reducing prices, the
subsidy may have caused more inefficiency, or at least might not
have done much to increase it.229 It is not clear how this might affect
information collection of off-label uses. An off-label use subsidy
would be directed primarily at collection, organization, formatting,
and dissemination of data on off-label use. As such, the quality of
the underlying technology used to capture that data is less
important, provided that it collects data with roughly the same
accuracy and information output as superior systems.
Another shortcoming of the meaningful use subsidy was its
exclusion of certain providers. While many providers—including
small, office-based providers were eligible230—some hospitals were
not. Psychiatric, rehabilitation, and long-term care hospitals were
ineligible.231 Following this path for off-label use would be a
significant missed opportunity, particularly because a large
percentage of off-label use occurs in psychiatry.232 Additionally,
many rehabilitation hospitals treat patients with no known cures or
few treatments, such as TBI, stroke, and chronic pain.233 Tracking
and studying off-label use in these settings is crucial to obtaining
information about both identification and validation of new uses.
They should, therefore, be eligible for the off-label subsidy.
229 See, e.g., Mennemeyer et al., supra note 216, at 378 (discussing the effect of the subsidy
on the adoption rate of the “Any EHR system”).
230 See Brian K. Bruen, Leighton Ku, Matthew F. Burke & Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, More
Than Four in Five Office-Based Physicians Could Qualify for Federal Electronic Health
Record Incentives, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 472, 474 (2011) (discussing the eligibility of small offices
for federal electronic health record incentives).
231 Id. at 477.
232 See supra notes 11, 18 and accompanying text.
233 Medicare has a specific definition of “rehabilitation hospital” for coverage and
reimbursement purposeI42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e), 1395ww(j)(1); 42 CFR §§ 482.1 et seq., 412.20,
412.604.
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Further study is needed, of course, to evaluate the costs and
benefits of using a subsidy modeled on the one used for EHRs. This
would require evaluating, among other things, eligibility, who could
qualify, the benchmarks required for qualification, and the
structure, amount, and duration of the subsidy. In the next Section,
I explore some of the requirements that are crucial to any
government subsidy and how they might be implemented in the
context of a new kind of subsidy: market inclusivity.
C. NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: MARKET INCLUSIVITY

Existing government programs provide an off-the-shelf
framework that reduces implementation costs. But, as we’ve seen,
there are still challenges to applying an existing framework offlabel, as it were: different problems may require modification of
existing systems or different systems altogether.234 While the last
Section describes the former, this Section describes the latter: what
I call the market inclusivity subsidy (MI Subsidy). Under this
program, providers who implement systems to generate, collect,
organize, and disseminate information about off-label prescriptions
are entitled to obtain a direct government payment for each off-label
use they track, with the size of the payment dependent on the
frequency and detail with which providers track it. Below I explain
how this potential solution would leverage existing provider
capabilities, which vary by size and type, to collect, organize, and
disseminate information about off-label uses.
1. Eligibility & Qualification. Like the meaningful use subsidy,
the MI Subsidy would have three components: eligibility,
qualification, and payment. Eligibility represents the possible
universe of individuals or entities that could obtain the subsidy.
Given that the subsidy is designed to collect as much information as
possible about off-label uses, in principle any provider should be
eligible.
234 Providers aren’t the only option, either. See Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, supra
note 25, at 739 (discussing the limited options that providers have when the FDA sequesters
valuable data). More recently, Congress has tried to combat this problem through increased
monitoring and information collection. See generally The Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in various
sections of 21 U.S.C.). As I explain below, this includes the Sentinel Initiative.
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Eligibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining
the subsidy. Eligible providers must still qualify for the subsidy,
which they can do by meeting conditions specified by the
government. By setting qualifications, the government forces
eligible providers seeking the subsidy to engage in the desired
activity. Here the desired activity is to collect information about offlabel uses, organize it, and disseminate it. Just what kind of
information—and the manner in which it should be collected,
organized, and disseminated—is open to debate.
But the debate is not without boundaries. To solve or mitigate
both Problems, information about off-label uses must have certain
characteristics. First, the data must be of a minimum type and
quantity. Information must contain, for example, the patient’s
diagnosis and the prescribed drug, including the dose, method of
administration, and frequency. It may also include other
information, such as previous prescriptions (both on- and off-label),
patient compliance, follow ups, adverse reactions, and other drugs
the patient is taking.
Second, this data must be uniformly formatted. While uniformity
isn’t a logical necessity, it is a practical one. Without it, efficient
data-mining and analysis would be impossible. Uniformly
formatted data enables information pooling and, hence, analysis of
a single dataset.235 A requirement of some minimum kind or amount
of data increases the value of the dataset: the more information
required, the more valuable the data set. At the same time,
additional requirements increase costs to providers: the higher the
minimum threshold, the greater the initial fixed costs to gather it.236
To determine the optimal formatting and minimum requirements,
the relevant federal agencies could form a commission, conduct a
pilot study, or both.237

235 See Joachim Roski, George W. Bo-Linn & Timothy A. Andrews, Creating Value in Health
Care Through Big Data: Opportunities and Policy Implications, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1115, 1116
(2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0147.
236 The relationship is not exactly one-to-one. Some data might be quite easy to get (e.g.,
low initial fixed costs) because of existing systems, while other data may be expensive to
obtain (e.g., high initial fixed costs).
237 This might be an opportunity for the FDA to make headway into specifying a uniform
format for EHRs—a problem that is particularly important as the FDA reviews more EHR
information. See FDA RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 17–18 (explaining that tools
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Third, uniformly formatted data must be communicated or
disclosed to the public (or a public agency) for the system to function
properly. The government, and even private actors, can’t realize the
benefits of data collection if the data are not available for analysis.
And, if data collection is done right, a dissemination or publication
requirement has the potential to cure the market failure in diffusion
of innovative new uses.238 Put another way, if the program causes
providers to collect information on innovative new uses, the
dissemination requirements will ensure that those new uses are
diffused.
Dissemination could take a variety of forms. One option is to
disclose data to the FDA, either by using an existing informationcollection program, such as the Sentinel Initiative,239 or by
developing a new one, either within the FDA or in a collaborative
effort with the CMS. Another is requiring providers to publish (some
limited) data on their own websites, a government website, or a
third-party service. Some combination of these—and others—is also
possible.240
Whatever and however information is produced, it’s important to
balance government expectations with provider capabilities. In
general, smaller providers—which constitute around 50% of all
providers241—are less sophisticated, have less technology, and have
fewer resources than large providers. Data collection requirements
for small providers, then, should probably be less onerous than
those for larger providers. One can imagine a program where small
providers have fewer system and data output obligations (e.g.,

must be developed in order to induce more effective use of RWE); see also id. at 25 (stating
that under the RWE Program, the FDA is also considering data standards for RWE.).
238 The CURE ID program attempts to fix this market failure by decentralized data
gathering. See CURE Drug Repurposing Collaboratory, supra note 179 (explaining that
CURE ID is dedicated to capturing clinical outcome data to advance drug repurposing and
inform future clinical trials).
239 See FDA RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 29 (defining the Sentinel Initiative as “a
long-term effort to create a national electronic system for monitoring FDA-regulated medical
products”).
240 There are HIPAA concerns with publishing data publicly that could counsel against a
dichotomous or layered approach in which some basic claims level data are published and
other data are submitted to the government for research purposes.
241 See Kane, supra note 178, at 5 (“In 2018, 56.5 percent of physicians worked in practices
with 10 or fewer physicians . . . .”).
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minimum requirements to track and disseminate prescription,
adverse reactions, drug, dose, formulation, diagnosis, existing
medications, and refill requests) than large providers (e.g.,
minimum requirements to implement a formulary, track all offlabel uses, patient follow up, off-label requests, etcetera, and
disseminate that information). Small providers could still be
encouraged to collect information required of large providers, as
explained below, through additional incentive mechanisms, like
bonus payments, that are built into the subsidy program.
With respect to large providers, Congress could leverage the
significant resources and structure of institutions like hospitals,
including P&T committees, to collect more data and to implement
evidence-based reforms for off-label uses. Congress might, for
example, mandate that larger providers build out and maintain a
dynamic formulary system. This formulary system could include,
among other things, a process for requesting, reviewing, approving,
and tracking off-label uses, as well as one for disseminating all of
this information in an organized and uniformly formatted
manner.242
Although some minimum requirements for a formulary system
are desirable, formulary systems needn’t be identical—at least not
at first. Some amount of experimentation is beneficial, and based on
current practices, we should expect it to occur. Formulary and P&T
procedures and practices vary quite widely by institution.243 And
although most hospitals have a formulary and a P&T committee,244
not many providers have systems in place to capture the needed

Not all off-label uses will be off-formulary; some off-label uses will be on the formulary.
See generally Anagnostis et al., supra note 166 (detailing different member institutions’
standards of practice).
244 Formularies are required to be eligible for Medicare payments. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.25
(2020) (“A formulary system must be established by the medical staff to assure quality
pharmaceuticals at reasonable costs.”). The regulations don’t require hospitals to establish a
P&T committee specifically. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb; 42 C.F.R. § 482 et seq. But as
part of the eligibility process, Medicare allows providers to obtain accreditation to avoid more
onerous state surveys. In essence, the government has farmed out the eligibilitydetermination process to various organizations, the most prominent of which is the Joint
Commission.
242
243
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data.245 This is true even though providers are quite adept at
collecting information for non-formulary (and off-label) uses.246
It’s also not that surprising. Each provider may have different
needs and institutional structures, politics, and financial outlooks.
Because of these differences, each provider is best positioned to
evaluate its own needs and develop a system suited to it. As more
providers seek MI Subsidies, practices will shift and become more
efficient. Providers that comprise numerous hospitals or practice
groups may seek to integrate or consolidate their formularies and
P&T committees as the benefits of doing so become apparent.247
Eventually, the FDA (or a similar agency) could commission a study
on the practices of providers and, based on its findings, use its
rulemaking authority to standardize and modernize market
inclusivity requirements.248
2. Market Inclusivity Subsidy. The third component of market
inclusivity is a subsidy. Eligible providers that qualify for a MI
Subsidy would obtain a direct payment for all “covered drugs.”249 A
“covered drug” means any drug used off-label that the provider
tracks with the specified system, as explained in more detail
below.250 In general, providers that track more drugs with greater
245 See Anagnostis et al., supra note 166, at 412–13 (showing that although non-formulary
use seems to be better tracked, what providers “tracked,” varies throughout the data).
Formularies, of course, may include many off-label uses that may not be tracked with
regularity.
246 See Anagnostis et al., supra note 166, at 412 (describing tracking methods for nonformulary medication use).
247 Large healthcare networks, which continue to grow, operate like franchises and impose
formulary requirements on their “members.”
248 Traditional clinical trials use standardized procedures for information collection and
recording. See, e.g., An-Wen Chan et al., SPIRIT 2013 Statement: Defining Standard Protocol
Items for Clinical Trials, 158 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 200, 202 tbl.1 (2013) (recommending
plans for data collection, management, and analysis as part of the standard protocol for
clinical trials). The FDA could apply a similar approach here. In the initial phases, the FDA
could roll out a pilot program to determine feasibility and areas for improvement.
249 The average cost would likely reflect private pricing schemes under Medicare Part D.
But it would also include the costs of drugs under Medicaid.
250 If the provider intends to claim tax credits for clinical trial research using this system,
rules might also require the system to include a process integrating the system into clinical
trials. The FDA has already begun promoting the integration of clinical trials into practice
settings. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FRAMEWORK FOR FDA’S REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE
PROGRAM
10–11
(2018)
[hereinafter
FDA
RWE
FRAMEWORK],
https://www.fda.gov/media/120060/download.
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detail would obtain a greater subsidy than those who track fewer
drugs with less detail. This should induce providers to track as
many off-label uses as possible while accounting for the different
capabilities of providers to track and monitor off-label use. The
overall benefits of this subsidy could be significant given that
patients fill over four billion prescriptions per year.251 The exact
amount of the MI Subsidy, however, should be set only after
sufficient research to determine the optimal subsidy to induce
providers to engage in the desired activity.
Without that research, though, it is possible to offer a few
comments about how this payment system might be structured.
First, economic incentives should drive providers to collect as much
information about off-label uses as possible. This will ensure that
the system captures not only information about existing off-label
uses but also information about new, innovative off-label uses.
Second, payments should be progressive: the more information
providers collect, and the more useful it is, the larger the payment
should be. Third, the incentive should encourage providers to
disseminate, as well as to collect and organize as described in
Section III.B, the off-label information that they track.
One method for achieving these aims is a point-based system.
Under a point-based system—such as the one the CMS currently
uses to incentivize alternative payment structures and quality
improvements252—the government scores entities along the desired
metrics by assigning them points based on compliance with
specified requirements.253 Various weighting techniques, along with
“bonus” points, can be used to emphasize some metrics over others
or to tailor incentives to different providers. Small providers—

251 Total Number of Retail Prescriptions Filled Annually in the United States from 2013 to
2025 (In Billions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/261303/total-number-ofretail-prescriptions-filled-annually-in-the-us (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).
252 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 414.1300–414.1465 (2020) (setting incentive payments for providers
that participate in eligible alternative payment models); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4 (describing a
fee schedule-based payments, a quality reporting system, and a merit-based incentive
payment system).
253 The CMS, for example, evaluates based on “quality performance,” “cost performance,”
“improvement activities performance,” and “Promoting Interoperability performance,” the
last of which is the EHR subsidy that the CMS folded into its requirements after the original
subsidy expired. 42 C.F.R. § 414.1380(a)(1) (2020).
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office-based practices with one or two physicians, for example254—
can receive bonus points for taking actions that larger providers
must take as a matter of course.255 Generally speaking, though,
entities that excel on the specified metrics receive more points than
those that perform poorly. Points are then compiled, weighted, and
summed.256
Currently, the CMS uses the sum to adjust providers’ Medicare
Part B payments: entities with high scores receive more payments
than those that receive lower scores.257 Weighting can be made
according to point totals, point totals relative to historical
“benchmarks,” or some combination of the two.258 In some cases, low
performing entities will not score any points (i.e., will not receive
payment for that metric) or may be penalized if they don’t meet
minimum point requirements in that category.259 Maximum or “top
out” payments can also be set for providers that score the maximum
number of points in any given year or in consecutive years.260
Congress could use a similar, but more robust, system to
incentivize providers to collect, organize, and disseminate
information about off-label uses. This probably would require
creating a new subsidy system that falls outside the scope of the
existing point-based system—perhaps even outside of the CMS—
which incentivizes providers by making adjustments to their
payments under Medicare Part B.
There are several reasons for devising a new subsidy system
rather than folding new requirements into an existing program. The
The CMS, for example, awards “bonus points . . . in small practices that submit data on
at least 1 quality measure.” Id. § 414.1380(a)(1)(i).
255 Bonus points are also given for treating complex patients. Id. § 414.1380(c)(3).
256 See id. § 414.1380(c) (providing final score calculation formulas).
257 See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1405 (providing payment adjustment factors based on how their
final score compares to performance thresholds and applying the adjustment factors to Part
B payments); see also 42 C.F.R. § 414.1380(b)(1)(ii) (overviewing benchmark requirements).
258 E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 414.1380(c) (providing methodology by which CMS weights and
reweights performance categories). This is similar to the concept of “yardstick competition.”
Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to
Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1786 (2015).
259 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 414.1380(a)(1)(i), (c) (describing how, “for the quality performance
category, measures are scored between zero and 10 measure achievement points” and
explaining the corresponding formula for calculating the final score of an eligible clinician).
260 See, e.g., 42 CFR § 414.1380(b)(1)(iv) (“CMS will identify topped out measures in the
benchmarks published for each Quality Payment Program year.”).
254
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first is that reimbursements under Medicare Part B may not be
sufficiently tied to the activity that the subsidy is designed to
address. The aim of the MI subsidy is to reduce the overall incidence
of improper prescriptions and increase the number of proper
prescriptions, not to improve care or service delivery under
Medicare Part B.261 Relatedly, providers do not generally receive
compensation for prescription drugs;262 compared to services,
providers receive almost no money for prescription drug costs.263
Folding additional payment adjustments into Part B, therefore,
might unduly affect the existing incentives (i.e., Medicare Part B
adjustments). Finally, although many providers serve individuals
whom public insurance covers, not all serve a sufficiently large
number of them. To capture as many uses as possible requires
paying as many people as possible.264
A new point system could take many forms. In the next few
paragraphs, though, I try to roughly sketch one of these possible
forms, as well as some of its potential drawbacks. In this system,
recall, providers can qualify by meeting certain minimum
requirements for collecting, formatting, organizing, and
disseminating data.265 Each of these categories, as well as others,
could serve as potential metrics along which to evaluate providers
and incentivize them to collect, organize, and disseminate more
data with greater granularity. Within the collection metric, for
261 Reducing unnecessary prescriptions may reduce costs under Medicare Part B because
patients may experience fewer adverse events and need less care. The primary savings,
however, will rebound to Medicare Part D, consumers, and payers.
262 The CMS does reimburse some drug costs to providers under Medicare Part B and uses
an incentive to induce providers to treat large proportions of low-income patients. 42 U.S.C.
§ 256(a)(1)–(3). The GAO recently found that the discount seemed to encourage prescribing
higher cost drugs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-442, MEDICARE PART B DRUGS:
ACTION NEEDED TO REDUCE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO PRESCRIBE 340B DRUGS AT
PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS (2015), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-442.
263 Providers that obtain certain drugs can obtain payments under Medicare Part B, but
this is not, by and large, the majority of prescription drug costs. See Cole Werble, Medicare
AFFS.
(Aug.
10,
2017),
Part
B,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000171/full/.
264 Casting a wider net, of course, will be more expensive. And it may raise sustainability
concerns for the program.
265 When the Meaningful Use Program began, its first stage had fifteen “core objectives”
that incentives were designed to induce eligible professionals to satisfy. 42 CFR § 495.20(d)
(2020).
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example, providers could earn points for performance in categories
like “prescription capture,” “patient follow-up,” “symptom tracking,”
“event tracking,” and “outcomes.” Providers that captured only the
drug and the off-label use for which it was prescribed would receive
the minimum number of points. Additional points could be awarded
for how well or poorly providers tracked patient compliance,
prescription changes (e.g., dosage, administration, discontinuation,
and additional/alternative medications), and event reporting (e.g.,
symptom reduction and side-effects or adverse events). A separate
category of points, or bonus points, could be used for “innovative”
new uses that a provider captures and disseminates.
Similar point categories could be developed for organization and
dissemination (by exceeding minimum requirements and meeting
additional standards). Providers, for example, could receive points
for disclosing the minimum level of data and additional points for
publishing some of the data on public-facing websites or in peerreviewed journals, disseminating it to drug compendia or even to
insurance providers. Eventually, metrics could be “benchmarked” to
past performance and subsidies allocated based on performance
relative to the benchmark.
Rewards can be a powerful motivator, but in appropriate
circumstances, penalties can spur the desired activity as well. It is,
therefore, worth considering how the new program might penalize
providers for noncompliance.266 Compared to “carrot” like subsidies,
“stick” like fines are much less costly.267 And they are also useful for
specifying and enforcing a minimum baseline of activity below
which providers can’t fall.268 Like the existing EHR Program, this
suggests that providers should be mandated to collect some
minimum quantum and quality of information or else face penalties.
Unlike the EHR program, however, penalties under the MI subsidy
program would not result in decreased Medicare adjustments;

266 See Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 214, at 1822 (describing how using potential
penalties incentivized producer innovation as it relates to Medicare’s hospital
reimbursements).
267 See id. at 1799–1800 (“Most importantly, . . . sticks do not need to be paid. Carrots, by
contrast, can be used up—if they are paid as a reward to one person, they cannot also be paid
to another.”).
268 See id. at 1803.
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rather, they would come as some other form of liability, such as a
fine.
There are, of course, drawbacks to using penalties to spur
behavior. If compliance costs are not identical for all actors,
penalties may disproportionately affect those who are least able to
comply.269 Actors who have difficulty meeting minimum
requirements may be forced to exit the market or to change their
business models in socially undesirable ways. This problem could
arise in the off-label information context if minimum requirements
are set too high for some or all providers. Small providers, in
particular, may be less equipped to absorb the costs of implementing
a new off-label information system. Penalizing them for failing to
implement it could have serious negative effects, such as reductions
in quality of care or staff.
Additionally, sticks are difficult to calibrate correctly when the
expected social value of the desired activity isn’t known.270 Tying
cost to expected social value is challenging because estimating the
existing cost of unnecessary or improper prescriptions is very
difficult—partly because there isn’t good quality information about
off-label prescriptions.271 But the government doesn’t actually have
to know the expected social value of the information generated, and
it probably couldn’t reliably estimate it if it tried. It can, instead,
determine the expected cost to the provider and set a penalty that is
sufficiently high to induce the provider to engage in the desired
activity but small enough that it will not affect the quality of the
provider’s existing services (or have other negative effects).
These difficulties suggest that a better approach might be a
program that induces providers to participate (by promising
payment) and then later penalizes participating providers for
noncompliance with program standards (by imposing discontinuing
payment or imposing a fine). Dangling a reward to induce provider
participation will encourage providers’ self-selection into the

269 See id. (describing how sticks may work best when “citizens have more or less equal
compliance costs” as opposed to more complex situations).
270 See id. at 1802.
271 See, e.g., STUART WRIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MEMORANDUM REPORT:
ENSURING THAT MEDICARE PART D REIMBURSEMENT IS LIMITED TO DRUGS PROVIDED FOR
MEDICALLY ACCEPTED INDICATIONS (2011) [hereinafter Wright, Medicare Part D
Reimbursement] (noting that there is a lack of information for off-label prescriptions).
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program based on the projected economic benefit. Once in the
system, provider behavior can be influenced by increasing or
decreasing payments based on their performance. Rewarding
participation would also enable a more effective system of sticks:
because providers have already selected into the system, fining
providers that fail to meet the minimum requirements is less likely
to have the undesirable consequences described above.
Subsidizing costs this way, however, may also lead to socially
undesirable prescribing patterns. Providers may prescribe and
track more drugs off-label to obtain greater subsidies. While this
risk is real, there are several existing mechanisms that
disincentivize prescribing in this manner. One is tort law.
Physicians who prescribe in ways that are detrimental to patients’
health face legal liability. Another is the physician’s professional
obligation.272 Ethics rules require physicians to treat patients in an
ethical manner; prescribing drugs unnecessarily and solely for
profit runs afoul of these rules.273 Physicians who violate ethics
rules risk losing their license.274
Costs imposed by law and professional organizations, however,
may not be a sufficient disincentive. Legally, for example, it is quite
difficult to prove medical negligence based on an off-label use.275
And physicians can avoid professional sanction by pointing to some
medical rationale for prescribing off-label. To combat this, subsidies
could be tied to the average rate of prescribing off-label. With
272 See, e.g., Medical Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 60/2, 60/10 (delegating
the power to regulate the practice of medicine to the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation); 68 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68 §§ 1285.200–1285.280 (2005) (stating
regulations governing practice of medicine, including standards for ethical conduct and the
procedures for disciplinary action).
273 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN CODE tit. 68, § 1285.240 (2005) (describing standards of unethical
or unprofessional conduct in medical practice).
274 See, e.g., Medical Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 60/22(A)(18) (listing
“[p]romotion of the sale of drugs . . . in such manner as to exploit the patient for financial
gain” as a violation of professional conduct punishable by license revocation).
275 See, e.g., Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation
of Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 666 (2011) (noting off-label
malpractice claims are rare in published cases). The more exotic the use, the greater the
threat of liability. See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber
and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L.
295, 317 (2003); Johnson, supra note 95, at 68 (noting off-label use can become the standard
of care, making physicians potentially liable for not prescribing off-label).
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sufficient data, the administering government entity could calculate
the average number of off-label prescriptions for a given use and
break out the data by provider type. It could then specify an
“allowable” range around the average prescription volume per
provider type. Providers whose prescription volume fell outside of a
specified range wouldn’t qualify for reimbursement.
An alternative strategy would use additional inducements to
curb socially undesirable behavior. Rather than punish providers
for overprescribing, this strategy would reward them for tracking
information that is most needed. The administering agency could,
for example, award more points for off-label information for rare
diseases, understudied diseases, or promising uses. The predicted
effect, following the logic above, would be more off-label
prescriptions (and information) and a corresponding increase in the
supply of information about the safety and effectiveness of off-label
uses in the areas where they are most needed or most likely to be
useful.
One final, but important, question is how long this subsidy
should last. Like with the meaningful use subsidy, the MI Subsidy
should be responsive to the costs associated with developing,
implementing, and maintaining the required system. The largest
cost to providers will be implementing the information system. Once
implemented, the costs of maintaining the system are unlikely to
outpace the fixed costs of creating it. While this may change with
more sophisticated data collection (e.g., large providers), continuing
to collect information will be much less costly after providers
implement data-collection systems. The precise amount of this
subsidy, how it should be maintained, and whether it should be
phased out entirely are all questions that are beyond the scope of
this Article. At the very least, however, Congress should consider
various options for continuing the subsidy, including phasing it out
completely, folding the subsidy into existing incentives, or requiring
renewal certifications for continued payments.
D. TAX CREDITS AND GRANTS

Direct government payments are not the only kind of subsidy
available to incentivize provider information collection,
organization, and dissemination. Tax incentives also can induce
providers to (a) institute information collection, organization
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systems, and procedures to capture off-label use, frequency, and
effects; or (b) generate data from clinical trials and (prospective)
observational research.276 Because I focused mainly on (a) in the
previous two Subsections, here I limit the discussion to (b). At
bottom, tax incentives are a way to get private parties to do things
by paying them.277 There are two kinds of tax incentives: credits and
deductions. Tax credits provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax
liability.278 Tax deductions, on the other hand, reduce the taxpayer’s
taxable income.279 Both can represent a government subsidy to
engage in a particular activity.280
Tax incentives are not new to pharmaceutical development.
Congress has used them in the past to stimulate production of
information about drugs—specifically clinical trial data about drugs
used to treat rare diseases.281 In the Orphan Drug Act (ODA), for
276 Here I don’t mean to limit “clinical trials” to double-blind, randomized controlled trials.
It could also include so-called “practical” clinical trials. See, e.g., Sean R. Tunis, Daniel B.
Stryer & Carolyn M. Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical
Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1626 (2003).
277 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. L. REV. 303, 307–08 (2013) (“[I]ncentives—like patents—leverage the value of
information held by private parties.”).
278 See Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/tax-exemptions-deductions-andcredits (last updated November 24, 2020) (“Taxpayers subtract their credits from the tax they
would otherwise owe to determine their final tax liability.”).
279 See id. (“[D]eductions indirectly reduce the amount of taxes a filer owes by reducing his
or her ‘taxable income,’ which is the amount of income on which a filer pays taxes.”).
280 Let’s assume a taxpayer has $100 in taxable income and is taxed at a rate of 35%. A $35
deduction would reduce the taxpayer’s taxable income to $65, which would be taxed at the
rate of 35%, for a total tax bill of $22.75. A $35 tax credit, on the other hand, would reduce
the taxpayers total tax liability of $35 to $0 (100*.35=35-35).
281 Existing law uses a combination of both deductions and tax credits. See David M.
Richardson, Orphan Drug Tax Credit: An Inadequate Response to an Ill-Defined Problem, 6
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 135, 168–69 (1987) (stating that the federal government agreed to fund “a
maximum of 73 percent of the portion of the orphan drug research expenses that constituted
‘qualified clinical testing expenses’”); Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote
Pharmacologic Research, to Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and
Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1057
(1994) (noting that the Section 174 deduction did not provide a sufficient incentive to
stimulate drug R&D, and as a result, Congress enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 which created the Section 41 research tax credit); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives
for Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 382 (1987)
(“Congress elected to offer businesses a tax credit for increasing (not merely paying) research
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example, Congress provided drug companies additional tax
incentives that allowed them to claim a tax credit of 50%282 (later
reduced to 25%283) of all expenses on human clinical testing of an
orphan drug.284 Companies could avail themselves of this maximum
credit only when they performed human clinical trials for orphan
drugs.285
A similar system could be used to subsidize providers to engage
in R&D of new and off-label uses. One option would borrow from the
Orphan Drug Act but expand the amount of credit available from
25% to 100% of all human clinical trials and prospective
observational studies conducted by providers.286 Just like the
current tax credit for research activities in Section 41 of the Tax
Code, this tax credit would apply only to increased research
and experimental expenditures.”). Compare 26 U.S.C. § 45C (describing a tax credit for
clinical testing for certain drugs for certain rare diseases), with 26 U.S.C. § 174 (describing a
deduction for “research and experimental expenditures”). Two tax credits apply regardless of
whether the research in question is for orphan drugs. See 26 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1)–(2) (explaining
the general rule for calculating the research credit for increasing research activities). In 2014,
the Treasury Department issued final regulations concerning Section 174 deductions. See
Research Expenditures, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,193, 42,194 (July 21, 2014) (clarifying deductions for
tangible property but also eliminating some uncertainty regarding whether some drugrelated expenses could be deducted, including pilot models). Given that all of the proposed
research activities—at least at first—would take place before filing an NDA and concern a
drug with an uncertain safety and efficacy profile, they will be deductible under Section 174.
See Crimm, supra note 281, at 1055, 1067, 1069 (arguing that tax incentives should be
available for research that does not necessarily lead to new a new drug but nonetheless leads
to pharmaceutical advancements).
282 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2053 (1983) (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)).
283 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2133, § 13401(a) (2017) (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a)).
284 The Tax Code does not allow for double- or triple-dipping on deductions and credits, but
deductions may cover activities that credits do not, and vice versa. See 26 U.S.C. § 280C(c)(1)
(disallowing deduction for qualified research activities determined as a credit); id. §
280C(c)(2) (requiring a like kind reduction in credits where qualified research expenses are
capitalized rather than deducted).
285 See 26 U.S.C. § 45C(b)(2)(A) (defining clinical testing as testing carried out under the
ODA for rare diseases); id. § 45C(b)(2)(B) (defining testing as some types of “[h]uman clinical
testing”); id. § 45C(d)(1) (defining rare disease or condition); Richardson, supra note 281, at
173 (noting ODA was not designed “to foster basic research into the causes of orphan diseases
or conditions or to fund or otherwise encourage preclinical testing”).
286 Alternatively, Congress could provide a 100% tax credit and then reduce the other
applicable credits by the claimed credit.
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activities.287 Put another way, providers could obtain a tax credit
only for those clinical trials and observational studies they wouldn’t
have otherwise undertaken.
Another option is to benchmark the “base rate” to the initial year
the tax credit is claimed. This would allow providers to engage in
the same level of research year-after-year without losing the tax
credit. Research “increases,” in other words, would always be
determined by a “base rate” set by the initial year the provider
claimed the tax credit.
Although it’s not entirely clear that this is the best approach,
there are at least three reasons favoring a dollar-for-dollar, fixedbase-amount tax credit. First, providers, unlike pharmaceutical
companies, have no way to recoup investment costs.288 And that’s
the entire point: information collection and analysis is not
something that providers use to generate profits.289 Second,
providers have less financial wherewithal than large
pharmaceutical firms to engage in research.290 Third, existing tax
incentives available to pharmaceutical companies may not be
available to providers.291 Whatever the optimal approach, Congress

287 See 26 U.S.C. § 41(a) (stating that the Section 41 tax credit of 20% for incremental
research is available only for “qualified research” expenses exceeding a “base amount”); 26
U.S.C. § 41(d)(1)(A) (noting that obtaining tax credits under Section 41 requires satisfying
the definition of R&E expenditure under Section 174); Crimm, supra note 281, at 1059–60
(describing prerequisites for the tax credit); see also Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.
& Peter R. Orzag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59
STAN. L. REV. 23, 32–42 (2006) (describing refundable tax credits); Crimm, supra note 281, at
1076 (stating that tax credits under the ODA are “neither refundable nor recapturable.”). It
is not clear whether this would make a real difference to providers, who will usually have
substantial taxable income. See Natbony, supra note 281, at 351 (noting that current R&D
incentives prejudice companies with no current taxable income). For those with less
substantial income, however, the benefits of a refundable tax credit could be quite significant.
288 It is possible to offer a reward for a provider that produces important research, but it
would require significant changes to the drug approval process. See infra Section IV.E.
289 Third parties may still use the publicly available data for profitable uses, of which there
are likely to be many. See infra note 300.
290 It may even be worth considering making these tax credits refundable—applicable
regardless of whether providers have any taxable income. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note
277, at 337 (explaining this feature of tax credits in other jurisdictions).
291 See Crimm, supra note 281, at 1052–55 (noting uncertainty of Section 174 deductions
for research directed at new products but emphasizing that research that “eliminates
uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a quality product” may be
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should consider these differences when deciding the type and
amount of any tax credit.
While tax incentives to providers are important, they don’t
necessarily optimize information generation. For various reasons—
size, location, demographics, or sophistication—individual
providers may not be able to produce the kind of information we
desire. For that reason, effective tax incentives will encourage
providers to collaborate.292 At the very least, the tax incentive
structure should not make it less attractive to collaborate than to
conduct research individually. Unlike the current tax credit for
university research,293 the tax credit for providers might allow
multiple providers to claim a (non-refundable or refundable) tax
credit for the relevant portion of the research conducted with other
providers.294
This is also an opportunity to encourage collaboration between
large and small providers295 or between industry and providers.296
Providers may work with payors to build out better pricing

deducted). Given that the research might simply provide more information about a use, and
not to a new product, this deduction may not be available. Id. at 1052–53.
292 Practical or pragmatic clinical trials, for example, may require numerous communitybased clinics jointly participate. See Tunis et al., supra note 276, at 1626–27. Sometimes
smaller providers may actually provide a more efficient option for clinical trials. See Johnson,
supra note 95, at 96–97.
293 See Crimm, supra note 281, at 1072–73 (noting criticism of Section 41(a)(2) credit on
grounds it does not “reward research undertaken by R&D consortia or alliances”). Credits can
be claimed, however, for the qualified research expenses under Section 41(a)(1). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 41(b)(3)(C) (stating that up to 75% of qualified research expenses paid or incurred by the
taxpayer to qualified consortia qualify as contract research expenses and are subject to the
20% credit under Section 41(a)(1)).
294 This would make any congressional action somewhat more complicated than simply
trading on the existing tax credit structure.
295 See e.g., Charles D. Cobau, Clinical Trials in the Community: The Community Clinical
Oncology Program Experience, 74 CANCER 2694, 2694 (1994) (describing a program designed
to transfer knowledge from large research institutions to small providers).
296 See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 44, at 17 (noting that comparativeness studies
frequently involve partnering with healthcare payors like insurance companies to leverage
large datasets); see also Thomas O. Stair, Caitlin R. Reed, Michael S. Radeos, Greg Koski &
Carlos A. Camargo, Variation in Institutional Review Board Responses to a Standard Protocol
for a Multicenter Clinical Trial, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 636, 636–641 (2001) (noting that
a local institutional review board (IRB) was inefficient and proposing a nationalized standard
for IRB review of multicenter clinical trials).
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mechanisms or evidence.297 Or third-party coordination services
may emerge to help organize, coordinate, and collect research across
providers (and potentially the pharmaceutical industry). Congress
would need to keep these concerns in mind when finalizing the
precise scope and details of this incentive.
Offering a tax credit to providers that generate information is
important, but it won’t necessarily solve either Problem. As Section
II.C. showed, information must be organized, analyzed, and
disseminated. Any tax credit should therefore be conditioned on
some kind of dissemination. One method might be to mandate that
providers register and publish all results on clinicaltrials.gov, a
measure that currently isn’t required for observational studies.298
Congress might also consider requiring providers to publish any
results, even if they show that a drug is not effective, in a format
that would normally be sufficient to satisfy peer-reviewed
journals.299 Another option is to require providers to submit raw
data and information, including study design and protocols, patient
notes, etcetera, to the FDA for purposes of detailed evaluation for,
See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 44, at 29–30 (noting that payors have best practices
and guidelines).
298 In 1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, which
required IND applications for experimental treatments of serious and life-threatening
diseases trials to register with the NIH. See generally Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296. Ten years later, Congress
passed the FDAAA, which expanded the clinical trials required to register and expanded
reporting requirements for results. See generally Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). In 2000, the NIH, working with the FDA, launched
clinicaltrials.gov to serve as the central registry. See History, Policies, and Laws,
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-site/history (last visited Apr. 26,
2022). Currently federal regulations require only some clinical trials to be registered. See 42
C.F.R. § 11.60 (2020) (listing requirements of voluntary registration); id. § 11.62 (stating
conditions under which mandatory registration is required). Specifically, only drugs in
controlled trials require registration. See id. at § 11.60(a) (specifying that this section applies
“[i]f a responsible party voluntarily submits clinical trial information for a clinical trial”). This
excludes small feasibility studies and observational studies. See 42 C.F.R. § 11.22(b)(1)(ii)
(2020). Under my proposals, providers undertaking these studies will be required to register
and publish in clinicaltrials.gov. The penalties for failing to register would be substantial.
299 In many cases, this never happens. See e.g., Joseph S. Ross, Tony Tse, Deborah A. Zarin,
Hui Xu, Lei Zhou & Harlan M. Krumholz, Publication of NIH Funded Trials Registered in
ClinicalTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, 344 BMJ d7292 (2012). If trials are discontinued
because of safety or efficacy concerns, it is critically important to make this information
publicly available in a central repository.
297
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among other things, safety and quality checks. Some centralized
database or repository of this information would be critical.300
Using tax credits this way may be particularly effective because
it ties them directly to outputs.301 Unlike tax credits to
pharmaceutical companies, tax credits to providers will produce
something. That something, of course, may show nothing; the
results may be inconclusive or may show that the drug has no
known therapeutic effects. But even if the something is about
nothing, knowing something about nothing is better than not
knowing about anything at all. There’s no risk that providers,
unlike pharmaceutical firms, will bury results showing that a drug
is not safe and effective because they don’t have strong incentives
to do so. Quite the opposite, to claim the tax credit, they must
disseminate their data.302
Tax credits may be an attractive choice because they are more
efficient than other push incentives, such as a government grant,
for two reasons. First, administrative costs can be lower.303 The
government doesn’t have to make allocation or investment decisions
based on little or no information about the known safety and
300 While not all information can be public, making as much public as possible is likely to
stimulate private industry to use it. This is already happening in other contexts, such as drug
reimbursement and FDA regulation. Compare Simon, Off-Label Information, supra note 67,
at 21–23 (describing drug compendia), with REDICA SYS. (FORMERLY GOVZILLA),
https://govzilla.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (providing a fee-for-service searchable
database of FDA data on inspections, enforcement, and registration), DEFINITIVE HEALTH
CARE, https://go.definitivehc.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (collecting and publishing public
information from the FDA), and FIRST DATABANK, https://www.fdbhealth.com/ (last visited
Apr. 26, 2022) (collecting and publishing a variety of government statistics).
301 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 277, at 326 (“[T]he most important question is not
whether tax credits increase R&D inputs (i.e., spending), but whether tax credits increase
R&D outputs (i.e., innovation).”).
302 They also may have an obligation to disclose safety risks they identify both to patients
and to the doctors who treat them. See, e.g., Kinetic Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d
933, 943 (D. Minn. 2009) (noting that once the hospital and physicians became aware of a
risk posed by a device, they had an obligation to replace the product to avoid further injury
caused by manufacturer). Pharmaceutical companies also have duties to disclose information,
which can result in a purposeful failure to generate it. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product
Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 628–29 (2007)
(describing ex ante and ex post incentives to produce and disclose information).
303 See Hemel and Ouellette, supra note 277, at 364–66 (noting “there is no evidence to
support the claim that the administrative and compliance costs associated with R&D tax
incentives are any greater than those associated with other innovative policy tools”).
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efficacy, as well as the unknown (or now well-known) risks, of the
thousands of off-label uses.304 The private market will. Second, this
makes the tax credit efficient from another perspective: providers
are likely to know their competences and capacities better than the
government. Each provider can assess the value of research that
qualifies for the tax credit. Providers with the best capabilities—
those that have the infrastructure and know-how to conduct this
research—are the most likely to avail themselves of the tax credit.305
None of this is meant to suggest that (non-refundable) tax credits
should be preferred over grants or other subsidies in every case.
Grants and subsidies have their own advantages, including an
ability to shape research in a more nuanced and directed way.
Grants (or refundable tax credits) also may provide a greater
incentive for for-profit providers than for tax-exempt and not-forprofit providers. Not-for-profit hospitals, for example, may derive
little or no benefit from a non-refundable tax credit because they
have no tax liability.306 In such cases, grants may be a more effective
means for inducing providers to engage in clinical trials despite
their higher administration costs.
Tax credits, though, do offer some unique advantages for forprofit providers that seek to engage in large-scale information
generation efforts. And they have a proven record of inducing some
R&D activity in the pharmaceutical space.307 Given that nearly half
of all physicians work for small, for-profit providers (small practices
or as solo practitioners), it’s also worth exploring how tax incentives
might induce them to engage in observational studies and
pragmatic clinical trials. Regardless of whether tax incentives are
aimed at large providers, small providers, or both, they must be
responsive to the financial pressures and structures of the providers
that they aim to influence. Further research into the financial
In some cases, risks will be known based on existing research.
Because of this, the tax credit may not be as effective as a direct subsidy, which might
entice even the uninitiated providers to seek payment. Alternatively, a tax credit could be
structured on a sliding scale designed to provide the greatest benefit (e.g., refundable tax
credits) to those least likely to utilize the credit because of resource limitations. See Johnson,
supra note 95, at 98 (noting that larger academic medical centers may be able to outpace
smaller ones because they can build in bigger margins to grants and research activities).
306 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (exempting nonprofit organizations from taxes if they meet
certain requirements).
307 See supra notes 277, 281.
304
305
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structure and compensation models of these providers is therefore
needed before recommending specific tax incentives.
E. MODIFIED MARKET EXCLUSIVITY, ROYALTIES, AND SUA SPONTE
LABEL EXPANSIONS

Push incentives, discussed above, are the most natural fit
because providers aren’t structured to take advantage of the
traditional pull incentives, such as regulatory exclusivity and
patent law. But it may be possible to harness a version of regulatory
exclusivity to stimulate more research. Doing so, however, would
require changes to how the FDA approves supplemental
indications.308
Currently drug approval—both for a new drug (which requires
an NDA) and a new use (which requires an sNDA)—requires filing
an application.309 While it is conceivable that multiple providers
might collaborate in research necessary to obtain FDA approval,
they have little financial incentive to do so. FDA approval, of course,
is beneficial because it signals a use’s safety and efficacy. This is
good for patients and physicians. Medicare uses this signal for
payment decisions, reimbursing for almost all approved uses of
approved drugs.310 This is good for drug companies. For new uses,
FDA approval entails regulatory (data) exclusivity.311 This could be
308 Most literature on off-label uses assumes that the proper endpoint for research is FDA
approval. See, e.g., Dr. Bobbie Ann Mount, in NCATS Meeting, supra note 30, at 10 (“In an
ideal world, we would like to solve the problems that exist between somebody coming up with
a new idea for a therapeutic indication pair and actually getting that indication on a drug
label.”). It is not entirely clear that this is necessary or even desirable. Given the existing
profile of many off-label uses, the FDA review may not be necessary for determining whether
a drug is safe and effective. Or, if it is, it may be better to off-load that process to a private
entity already doing this work. See Simon, Off-Label Information, supra note 67, at 19. See
Kevin W. Su, Cary P. Gross, Nicholas S. Downing, Kerin B. Adelson & Joseph S. Ross, Cancer
Therapeutic Clinical Trials Supporting FDA Approval and Compendia Inclusion, 9 AM. J.
PHARM. BENEFITS 122, 127–28 (2017) (noting that evidentiary standards that compendia
used for addition of off-label uses in cancer matched the one used by the FDA to approve
supplemental indications).
309 A drug sponsor may file either an NDA or an sNDA for a new use of a previously
approved NDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.71 (2020).
310 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iv) (Medicare Part D); Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking
Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2314–15 (2018) (discussing Medicare Part B).
311 See supra note 140.
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good for drug companies but is of little use to providers because they
usually have no ownership interest in the relevant drug (company).
One way to nudge providers to file applications is by modifying
regulatory exclusivity. Instead of offering providers regulatory
(data) exclusivity, which has little economic value, the government
can provide them with a small royalty payment if their research is
used to support an approved new use. In the same way a lottery
attracts a large volume of players that are guaranteed to lose, this
system might induce providers to (conduct and) publish their
studies even when the chance of winning, and the amount to be won,
is minute. Unlike a lottery, though, winners are paid, in part, for
the quality of their efforts, not merely for their payment to play.
Payouts could be made according to an endless variety of
formulae. One might calculate a fixed royalty per new use approved
based on a percentage of the retail price of the drug. Another might
leave the rate up to an administrative tribunal at the FDA or some
other administrative agency within the department of Health and
Human Services (the HHS), as occurs in other areas of law.312
Whatever the approach, the rate should be small enough to only
marginally increase drug prices and large enough to provide a
modest inducement to providers to engage in research.313 Royalties
would be paid to providers only if they make all of their data
publicly accessible.314 A provider who seeks to participate in the
royalty scheme, in other words, must make all of its data available
to the public.
Providers would be entitled to an amount proportionate to their
research contribution used for FDA approval. More robust studies
would entitle providers who conducted them to a greater share of
the royalty than providers who conducted smaller, uncontrolled
312 If a fixed royalty rate increases investment in more profitable uses at the expense of less
profitable ones, the royalty-setting entity should have the flexibility to alter royalty rates to
change incentives. One possibility is to have the GAO evaluate royalty effects and make
recommendations to the FDA at regular intervals (e.g., every five years). Some government
agencies already do this. See 17 U.S.C. § 801 (explaining that the copyright royalty board sets
rates and reasonable terms for royalty payments).
313 Another possibility is to direct all royalties to a fund that is managed by a board or
trustee on behalf of all participating providers. The board or trustee would make decisions
about how to allocate the funds it receives from royalty payments.
314 Universal formatting issues are less of a problem here because standard protocols on
clinical trials exist. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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studies.315 The FDA or the CMS could leverage existing evidencerating systems to evaluate the quality of any given study and assign
it weight for purposes of the royalty payment.316
A royalty might encourage providers to collaboratively research
new uses and file NDAs for them. But it’s not clear that the returns
will be sufficiently high to encourage collaboration because the FDA
approval process is expensive and because it will be difficult to
exclude others from the new uses, reducing or eliminating the
ability to charge supracompetitive prices. One alternative approach
would be to use this incentive system but change the drug approval
process. Rather than require applications for every new use, the
FDA could consider and expand drug uses either by petition or sua
sponte.
A petition approach, which the FDA uses for a variety of matters
including drug approval,317 would allow interested entities to lobby
the FDA to consider expanding a drug’s labeling.318 Upon reaching
some threshold—a certain quality of information or a certain
number of petitions, for example—the FDA could voluntarily
initiate a review for the expanded indication. The FDA would then
have either the option or the obligation (if some threshold was met)
to consider expanding the labeling to cover the new use in question.
It could then solicit further comments and information from
interested parties and conduct its own evaluation of existing
evidence.

This could be implemented in various ways. One method would be to use the studies
cited on the approved drug labeling. Another might be for the FDA to use internal scoring
systems to quantify what role that the study played in approval of the new use.
316 For some general background on different rating systems, see Simon, Off-Label
Information, supra note 67, at 27–29.
317 Regulations currently allow citizens to petition the FDA to take “administrative action.”
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.25, 10.30 (2020). A similar process could be used for providers seeking
modified market exclusivity rights. The definition is broad enough to include label
expansions. See id. § 10.3 (“Administrative action includes every act, including the refusal or
failure to act, involved in the administration of any law by the Commissioner . . . .”); see also
Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 249, 259–63 (2012) (explaining citizen petitions and how companies can use them in
anticompetitive ways by, for example, delaying generic and brand-name competitor entry).
318 Citizens can file a petition specifically seeking to delay an ANDA, a 502(b)(2) drug
application (a “paper” NDA), or NDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1). For example, petitions can
be used to request withdrawal of guidance documents. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(f)(4).
315
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Alternatively, the FDA could consider labeling updates sua
sponte, something it has begun doing with certain cancer drugs,319
and something it could do for other drugs under recently introduced
legislation.320 The FDA’s current program could serve as a test case
for a future in which the FDA “approves” new uses on its own
initiative.321 In this universe, the FDA would need to continually
evaluate data on off-label uses as information becomes available.
This approach would make good sense if other incentives designed
to increase data about off-label uses—like those discussed above—
were successful.322 If chosen, this path would require a more
systematic approach to evaluating new efficacy indications,
including a detailed framework for initiating a review, reviewing,
and eventually expanding indications.
One version of this could include an FDA-initiated notice-andcomment period. During this period, the FDA would solicit
Currently the FDA is updating labeling for oncology drugs in a somewhat related way
through Project Renewal. See Project Renewal, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/oncology-center-excellence/project-renewal (last visited Apr.
26, 2022). The details of this project are quite scanty, but there are two goals. The first is to
update labeling that is not consistent with the current standards in 42 C.F.R. § 201.56. The
second is to assess labeling for drugs with “significant off-label use in” oncology. See Project
Renewal FAQ, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/projectrenewal/project-renewal-faq (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
320 Representatives Brett Guthrie and Doris O. Matsui recently introduced legislation that
proposed to do something similar for previously-FDA approved drugs that had been
withdrawn and were not covered by a patent or regulatory exclusivity. See Making Objective
Drug Evidence Revisions for New Labeling Act of 2020, H.R. 5668, 116th Cong. (2d Sess.
2020).
321 Under the Sentinel Initiative, the FDA has evaluated a number of drugs for safety
concerns on its own. It also has, in limited cases, used non-traditional evidence to approve an
NDA. See FDA RWE FRAMEWORK, supra note 160, at 9 (“In limited instances, FDA has
accepted RWE to support drug product approvals, primarily in the setting of oncology and
rare diseases.”); Tony Durmowicz & Mike Pacanowski, Novel Approach Allows Expansion of
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
Indication
for
Cystic
Fibrosis
Drug,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/novel-approach-allows-expansionindication-cystic-fibrosis-drug (last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (“To approve the indication
expansion, a novel approach was used that relied on evidence from laboratory-based in vitro
assay data.”); Sandra Levy, FDA Approves Expanded Indication for Amarin’s Vascepa, DRUG
STORE NEWS, https://drugstorenews.com/fda-approves-expanded-indication-amarins-vascepa
(last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (summarizing the FDA’s approval of Amarin).
322 When Congress enacted the 21st Century Cures Act, it provided that this kind of
evidence could be used to support an NDA. See 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong.
(2016).
319
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information about the safety and efficacy of a new indication that
it’s considering.323 After obtaining public comment, the FDA could
issue a new label if the evidence merited an update. Another might
build on the recent legislation the House of Representatives passed
(the MODERN Labeling Act).324 The legislation, while specific to a
narrow set of potential new uses,325 authorized the Secretary of
HHS to identify drugs whose labels merited updating based on
several criteria.326 The Secretary could identify drugs by entering
into agreements with third parties to review evidence, by soliciting
public input by holding public meetings, by soliciting public
comments, or by “other means, as the Secretary determines
appropriate.”327
Either approach—petition or sua sponte—would give various
organizations (patient rights advocates, consumer groups,
pharmaceutical companies, and providers) the ability to seek
expanded indications based on safety and efficacy data. With a
formal petitioning process, this is obvious. But even with no official
petitioning process, various stakeholders can pressure the FDA to
study expanded indications—much in the same way groups petition
the FDA for compassionate use.328 It may even incentivize providers
to collaborate on observational studies and pragmatic or clinical
trials so that information could be packaged to the FDA in the most
persuasive and coherent format.
323 For potential problems with notice-and-comment rulemaking, see for example, Richard
Murphy, Enhancing the Role of Public Interest Organizations in Rulemaking via Pre-Notice
Transparency, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 687–88 (2012).
324 See Making Objective Drug Evidence Revisions for New Labeling Act of 2020, H.R. 5668,
116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020) (discussing the legislation).
325 The legislation defined “covered drug” as one with no existing patent or regulatory
exclusivity protections and whose prior FDA approval had been withdrawn for reasons
unrelated to safety or effectiveness. See Making Objective Drug Evidence Revisions for New
Labeling Act of 2020, H.R. 5668, 116th Cong. § (a)(1)(A)–(B) (2d Sess. 2020).
326 See Making Objective Drug Evidence Revisions for New Labeling Act of 2020, H.R. 5668,
116th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2d Sess. 2020) (defining “covered drug”); id. § 2(b) (authorizing
HHS Secretary to identify drugs for labeling updates).
327 Id. § 2(b)(1)–(2).
328 See Expanded Access, supra note 46. Activists during the HIV/AIDS epidemic were
crucial to moving the FDA toward the current expanded access paradigm. See also E. Nichols,
Historical Perspective – Expanding Access to Investigational Therapies for HIV Infection and
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK234129/
AIDS, NCBI BOOKSHELF (1991),
(emphasizing the historical background of the expanded access program).
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This kind of system is not without risk. One principal worry is
that the system will perpetuate the shortcomings of the existing
private market—namely, providers will engage in research that
pays the highest return, or the quickest one.329 This could mean
investing in research in drugs most likely to obtain approval (based
on previous research) or those that generate the most sales. In
either case, the system would bend toward maximizing the reward
rather than patient benefit.
While this is a real problem, it is not insurmountable. Royalties
or payments could be structured to reflect need instead of, or in
addition to, sales. Alternatively, a fixed fee—or a prize330—could be
used to reduce some of the distortionary effects of profit-seeking
that occur in the current pharmaceutical market. Prizes—rewards
for achieving a goal set by the government—could also be tied to
various socially desirable outcomes, such as approval of a new
indication for treatment of a rare disease or of a widespread disease
with limited or no treatments. The size of the prize could be
determined by studying the likely social benefit from obtaining the
desired information.331
Attention to rewards should not obscure the positive
externalities of generating negative information. Providers that
engage in information generation that shows a drug is not safe or
effective have done something socially beneficial. That particular
off-label use can be ruled out, saving the costs of the medication, any
potential costs of adverse events, and potentially, an improved
patient outcome with alternative or no treatment. To ensure that
there are adequate incentives to invest in trials that may produce
such information, any rewards system should account for the
positive externalities of negative information. To do so, it’s
important that any royalty or reward system is coupled with
incentives like those discussed in Sections A–C and potentially
329 See Budish et al., supra note 26, at 2045–46. (noting that “corporate short-termism and
fixed patent terms reinforce each other in distorting private research dollars away from longterm investments”).
330 Rachel E. Sachs, Paul B. Ginsburg & Dana P. Goldman, Encouraging New Uses for Old
Drugs, 318 JAMA 2421, 2422 (2017) (“The government or foundations could provide prizes or
financial incentives to payers, health care systems, or manufacturers for conducting new-use
research.”).
331 See Sachs et al., supra note 330, at 2422 (“The reward amount could be tied to a useful
clinical and policy end point, such as reduced nursing home admissions.”).
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others not yet known. This is particularly important for providers
because they, along with payers, are one of the few entities that has
a direct interest—improving patient outcomes332—in producing
negative information about drugs that might be harmful or
useless.333

V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that two of medicine’s pressing
problems—doctors prescribing approved drugs for unapproved uses
and firms lacking incentives to develop new uses of existing drugs—
often arise from the same informational deficit: a lack of safety and
efficacy information about the unapproved uses of approved drugs,
so-called off-label uses. It pointed out that all new uses of approved
drugs are off-label uses, and some off-label uses are new. Safety and
efficacy information about new uses, in other words, will always be
safety and efficacy information about off-label uses. And some
information about off-label uses will be information about new uses.
This observation revealed a new possible solution to both of these
tricky Problems: incentivize those entities that already produce, or
have the capability to produce, this information to collect, organize,
and disseminate it. Healthcare providers, it was noted, not only
have this capability but also have a variety of institutional
competencies and advantages that make them a rich potential
source of the needed information. To show how these provideroriented inducements might function, this Article adapted four
incentives from the existing innovation literature: two subsidies, a
tax credit, and a royalty or a prize. Each of these examples

332 Providers may have countervailing financial interests if they are compensated based on
(service) volume. More prescriptions may lead to larger payments. And more adverse events
from off-label prescriptions, for example, may increase the overall profit margin of a provider.
But providers also have ethical and legal obligations when they treat patients that limit the
influence of these potentially socially undesirable economic incentives. See Frank A. Riddick,
Jr., The Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, 5 OCHSNER J. 6, 5–7
(2003). Doctors certainly don’t set out to cause adverse events, and the primary aim of
treatment isn’t to inflate provider costs.
333 Eisenberg & Price, supra note 44, at 5 (“Studying the consequences of past clinical care
to improve healthcare practice is an important research frontier with the potential to yield
valuable innovations.”).
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illustrated that there are ways to leverage provider capabilities to
help solve both of these important problems.
What this Article did not do—and what future work should do—
was explore all possible incentives that could be applied to providers
and their advantages and disadvantages. This would have required
a more detailed analysis of providers and their current institutional
operations and infrastructure. Prizes, for example, might be useful
to generate data on off-label uses—even if those data are negative.
But a particular type of prize may work well for large but not small
providers, or vice versa, because of economic and resource
constraints or specialization. Beyond the specific setting in which
prizes may be used, as an incentive they are less effective when the
social value of the desired activity is difficult to estimate. Similar
analysis applies to non-refundable tax credits. While they work well
for pharmaceutical companies, they may not work for providers like
hospitals, many of which are non-profit entities. In such cases, a
direct cash payment—a grant or refundable tax credit—might do
more to induce providers to maintain systems that collect, organize,
and disseminate information about off-label uses, particularly if
grants are made more than once. In other words, each type of
incentive has its own benefits and drawbacks that need to be
assessed relative to the social problems they are designed to address
and the entities to which they apply. These issues, and many others,
should be addressed in future research.
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